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INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia has described an originalist approach to interpretation as a
prerequisite to faithful application of a written Constitution. If, says he, constitu-
tional judicial review is implicit in the notion that the Constitution is paramount
law, as has been settled in this country at least since Marbury v. Madison,1 then
that review must be guided by the ordinary tools of legislative interpretation.2 In
a democracy, serious legislative interpretation requires that judges keep faith
with the meaning of the text as understood at the time of enactment, not as
desired by those judges or by anyone else who does not, in the relevant way,
represent the will of the People. To pledge allegiance to the understandings or
the will of contemporary majorities—or, worse, of contemporary judges—is to
subvert the aim of higher lawmaking. “The purpose of constitutional guaran-
tees,” Justice Scalia has written, “is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting
certain changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution
thinks fundamentally undesirable.”3
A substantial number of legal academics regard this as hogwash. For one
thing, Justice Scalia’s writings on constitutional interpretation reflect a restless
fixation on what is, to many, a false dichotomy. Non-originalists do not gener-
ally imagine themselves to be making up constitutional meaning as they go
along, or even to be seeking “the desirable result for the case at hand.”4
Whether or not interpretive constraints other than original meaning are more
difficult to apply and discern, there is no reason beyond Justice Scalia’s own
(formidable) imaginings to think them less constraining. Nor does rejecting the
supremacy of the framing generation’s understanding of the import and limita-
tions of the Constitution’s language portend the interpretive paralysis that
Justice Scalia supposes it does.5 At the very least, it does so no more than his
“time-dated” version of originalism,6 which compels judges to engage in an
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989).
3. Id. at 862.
4. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 3, 39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
5. Scalia, supra note 2, at 855; see also Scalia, supra note 4, at 44–46.
6. See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
129, 147–49 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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often contentious and indeterminate historical examination that is beyond their
institutional competence. And if democratic legitimacy is the measure of a
sound constitutional interpretive practice,7 then Justice Scalia needs an account
of why and how rote obedience to the commitments of voters two centuries
distant and wildly different in racial, ethnic, sexual, and cultural composition
can be justified on democratic grounds. The proposition that, absent open
revolution, we may change an ancient Constitution only through the onerous
and constitutionally endogenous Article V process is both undemocratic and
unattractive.
Whatever its theoretical shortcomings, however, originalism in practice is at
least as healthy today as it was when Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986.
Arguments from original intent or original meaning are a prominent feature of
both our legal practice and our constitutional pop culture, such as it is. The
force of such arguments was dramatically in evidence in the Court’s decision
last Term in District of Columbia v. Heller,8 which struck down the District’s
handgun ban and threatens to invalidate numerous others. Not only did Justice
Scalia secure five votes for the most thoroughgoing originalist opinion in the
Court’s history, but Justice Stevens’s dissent appeared to engage rather than
challenge the majority’s originalist premises.9 Perhaps the two most significant
lines of criminal law cases of the last decade, those resting on Apprendi v. New
Jersey10 and Crawford v. Washington,11 rely primarily on originalist reasoning,
and on talk radio, on cable news, and in the blogosphere, originalist constitu-
tional presuppositions remain vibrant. Polls report that nearly half of Americans
claim to believe that the original intentions of the Constitution’s authors should
be the sole consideration in Supreme Court constitutional interpretation,12 and
about seven in ten believe it is “very important” for a good Supreme Court
Justice to “uphold the values of those who wrote our Constitution two hundred
years ago.”13 Notwithstanding its many academic critics, originalism continues
to sell.
Originalism’s resiliency comes at a time when constitutional methodology
more generally has assumed a cultural prominence it has not always enjoyed.
This is not a coincidence. As others have noted, exalting originalism was part of
7. See Scalia, supra note 2, at 862.
8. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
9. See id. at 2822–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (prohibiting increasing criminal sentences beyond
the statutory minimum based on facts not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
11. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (prohibiting out-of-court testimonial statements at
trial under the Confrontation Clause).
12. Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, American Voters Oppose Same-Sex
Marriage Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, but They Don’t Want Government To Ban It (July
17, 2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us07172008.doc.
13. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations: Positivity Theory
and the Judgments of the American People 141, 163 tbl.4.5 (Sept. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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a deliberate effort by the Reagan Justice Department to rally Americans against
a Federal Judiciary it perceived as frustrating its conservative political agenda.14
Deliberately using an interpretive methodology as a site for political mobiliza-
tion was novel15 and has contributed to heightened popular attention to “judicial
philosophy” as a subject of conventional political discourse. When John Mar-
shall Harlan was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1955, Judiciary Committee
members asked him three questions about constitutional methodology, less than
two percent of the total questions he was asked.16 By contrast, John Roberts
was asked 135 questions about methodology at his televised 2005 confirmation
hearing, representing about one out of every seven questions he was asked.17 As
confirmation fights have become more contentious, politicized, and popularized,
so too has the discourse around methodology that was—deliberately—so central
to the pivotal Robert Bork hearing of 1987.
In short, there appear to be more consumers of constitutional arguments than
there have been in other times, and they are consuming originalist rhetoric in
relatively large numbers. Still, for all the trees slain in exposition of original-
ism’s theoretical bona fides vel non, few legal scholars have focused on
constitutional methodology generally, or on originalism in particular, as items of
political commerce.18 Those in the legal academy who have examined the
“selling” of originalism have tended to focus on the “supply” side; that is, they
have studied how originalism has been used by political actors to further
political ends.19 This Article views the market for constitutional methodologies
more holistically. Originalism is not only instrumental to a particular political
agenda but is also responsive to a set of demands the public makes during
moments of constitutional engagement. I therefore examine originalism as a
constitutional aesthetic, in order to distill those features that make it an attrac-
tive part of our overall conception of the role of a constitutional judge.
This inquiry is vital not only as a matter of political strategy but also, as
importantly, to develop more fully those (generally non-originalist) interpretive
14. See Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen. of the United States, The Supreme Court of the United States:
Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, Address Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in 27
S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465–66 (1986); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice:
The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 559 (2006).
15. Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 548.
16. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
18. Those few include Robert Post and Reva Siegel, see Post & Siegel, supra note 14, and Jack
Balkin, see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). For
related perspectives, see also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 245 (1995) (“The dominant rhetoric
of judges, even activist judges, is originalist, for originalism is the legal profession’s orthodox mode of
justification.”), and Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitu-
tional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 951 (2001) (remarking that legal academics “do not know
enough about how the public gets its information about constitutional decisions, about public support
for the institution of judicial review, about the extent to which the Justices are aware of or influenced by
public opinion, and about the conditions under which political actors will heed judicial decisions with
which they disagree”).
19. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 14.
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theories that regard public acceptance as a strong criterion for legitimacy. It is
not enough to recognize the salience of originalism as a matter of subconstitu-
tional politics; constitutional theory must itself confront and, as necessary,
accommodate the political practice of originalism. Doing so may illuminate
ways in which, paradoxically, originalism may help resolve the countermajoritar-
ian difficulty in practice even if it fails to do so in theory. That is, originalism’s
responsiveness to public demand may supply it with a legitimating force that, as
non-originalists have ably demonstrated, it otherwise lacks.
I begin, in Part I, with a brief description of the academic debate over
originalism, which is either at an impasse or, less sympathetically, has demon-
strated that a strong form of originalism lacks satisfactory theoretical grounding.
Part II documents originalism’s growth and success as a constitutional methodol-
ogy, both in judicial practice and within the larger political culture. Part III
discusses the place of public appeal in constitutional theory. I argue that an
account of why originalism is successful is crucial to fundamentally non-
originalist interpretive theories insofar as those theories regard continued public
acceptance as an important legitimating criterion for an interpretive regime. I
then begin to develop a descriptive model for the marketing of originalism. I
suggest that a form of democratization of the market for constitutional ideas has
broadened the audience of concern for constitutional methodologies, thereby
making populist methodologies, and the populist features of individual method-
ologies, bear greater emphasis. Originalism’s proponents have taken advantage
of this dynamic by speaking of originalism in simple and transparent terms, by
highlighting the putative limitations originalism places on judicial elites, and by
emphasizing originalism’s distinctively American character. Finally, in Part IV, I
offer some brief thoughts on what this Article’s observations augur for other
methodologies, particularly Chief Justice Roberts’s “minimalism” and Justice
Breyer’s “active liberty.”
I. ORIGINALISM AND ITS DETRACTORS
Before I discuss the tension between originalism as a jurisprudence and
originalism as a constitutional aesthetic, I should explain the terms I am using
and justify my earlier claim that the theoretical debate over originalism is either
inconclusive or has been lost by strict originalists. Even Justice Scalia, who
lambasts non-originalists for their eclecticism, concedes that originalism takes a
variety of forms.20 It is therefore necessary first to identify the specific original-
ist model with which I am concerned and to outline its traditional defenses. I
then discuss the most effective critiques of that model.
A. WHOSE ORIGINALISM?
Originalism is an inconstant term. Among contemporary constitutional theo-
20. See Scalia, supra note 2, at 855.
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rists it most often refers to the normative constitutional interpretive theory that
instructs judges faced with indeterminate textual guidance to look primarily to
the original understanding of a particular clause’s ratifying generation. The
inquiry is meant to be objective rather than subjective and so—with little to no
loss of purchase—the original understanding of a clause’s ratifiers is often
conflated with the “original public meaning” of the clause’s text. Not everyone
associated with originalism has endorsed original understanding or original
meaning as the appropriate object of concern. Raoul Berger, for example,
though an intellectual patron of the originalism movement, believed that consti-
tutional interpretation must be faithful to the intentions of the drafters.21 Few
academic originalists maintain this position,22 and the theoretical gulf between
an original meaning approach and an original intent approach can be vast
indeed.23 Nonetheless, the term originalism is capacious enough to embrace
both theories, and the political rhetoric associated with originalism does not
distinguish between the two.24 Because academic criticisms of “original under-
standing” generally apply with equal (and at times greater) force to “original
intent,” nothing follows from my bracketing of the latter for the purposes of this
Part.
There is a secondary question of which understanding originalists consider
authoritative. Is it the original meaning of the words of a constitutional provi-
sion or the provision’s original expected application? On Ronald Dworkin’s
formulation, is it “what some officials intended to say in enacting the language
they used” or is it instead “what they intended—or expected or hoped—would
be the consequence of their saying it”?25 This is a question of the level of
generality at which we should assess the ratifying generation’s original under-
standing. Dworkin insists that Justice Scalia errs in focusing on original ex-
21. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
4 (2d ed. 1997). I am not aware of any evidence that Berger reflected seriously on the distinction
between original meaning and original intent.
22. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144
(1990); Scalia, supra note 4, at 38; see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive
Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1137 (2003) (“By the mid-
1980s, if not earlier, ‘original intent’ was on the wane and ‘original understanding’ was on the rise.”).
23. Intentionalist interpretation is a more natural ally of purposivism, which the Scalia School
ferociously rejects in the statutory context.
24. See, e.g., LORI J. OWENS, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT: THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 1 n.1 (2005) (stating casually that “original meaning,” “original
understanding,” “interpretivist,” and “original intent” are interchangeable for the purposes of the
political debate around originalism on the Court); Scalia, supra note 4, at 38 (“[T]he Great Divide with
regard to constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but
rather that between original meaning (whether derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current
meaning.”); see also infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
25. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 115,
116 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). This mirrors Dworkin’s well-known distinction, in earlier work,
between general “concepts” of moral or political values and specific “conceptions.” See RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134–36 (1977).
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pected application rather than original meaning in constitutional interpretation.26
Justice Scalia denies the charge, insisting that he and Dworkin agree in principle
that it is not original expected application but original meaning—what Dworkin
calls “semantic intention”—that controls.27 The disagreement between two
learned men over what kind of originalist Justice Scalia is confirms that this
distinction resists intelligent application. It is difficult to conceive of better
evidence of the “semantic intention” behind constitutional text than how that
text was expected to be applied. Paul Brest understated things, I think, when he
said that “[a] principle does not exist wholly independently of its author’s
subjective, or his society’s conventional exemplary applications, and is always
limited to some extent by the applications they found conceivable.”28 Let it
suffice for now to say that in practice, Justice Scalia’s originalism does not
allow constitutional interpretations to prohibit what was permitted at the time of
the relevant clause’s enactment.29 It is this version of originalism, however
labeled, that is the subject of this Part.
Finally, we can distinguish between originalism as a constitutional adjudica-
tive practice and originalism as a method of ascertaining constitutional mean-
ing. Students of the philosophy of language debate whether the semantic
meaning of a text is provided by the intentions of its author.30 Identifying
oneself as a semantic originalist does not commit one to the view that original-
ism is the appropriate method of constitutional interpretation.31 Likewise, a
belief that federal judges should resolve textual ambiguity in favor of original
meaning need not necessarily entail a belief that constitutional provisions mean
what they meant when they were enacted, although Justice Scalia appears to
hold both views. Thus, the claim that the political branches or ordinary citizens
should identify, motivate, or act upon tacit changes in constitutional meaning
but that judges should be originalists is a coherent normative position. More-
over, extrajudicial actors do of course actively engage in both originalist and
non-originalist constitutional interpretation. This Part, however, is concerned
primarily with judicial constitutional practice, which has for many years been
the principal terrain of the debate over originalism.
26. See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 116–22.
27. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 144–47.
28. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 217
(1980).
29. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 141.
30. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why
Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004); Stanley Fish, There
Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629 (2005).
31. See Posting of Lawrence Solum to Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal theory/
2007/10/semantic-and-no.html (Oct. 30, 2007, 00:30 EST). Some scholars distinguish constitutional
interpretation, which properly aims at divining the meaning of the text, from constitutional construc-
tion, which in this nomenclature refers to the fashioning of legal rules to govern the adjudication of
controversies surrounding vague textual commands. See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). Whatever the merits of
this distinction, I choose not to honor it in this Article.
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B. WHY ORIGINALISM?
The central conceit behind originalism as a mode of judicial constitutional
interpretation is that it is more consistent with constitutional democracy than are
its competitors. Both words—“constitutional” and “democracy”—are impor-
tant. Constitutionalism entails a judicial commitment to a written text that is
superior to the ordinary legislative enactments of present majorities. The author-
ity of unelected judges to override majority will derives exclusively from that
written text and from the status of that written text as law. Legal interpretation
has rules that are familiar to lawyers, and it is part of this country’s legal custom
to give effect to the intent of the parties when interpreting written documents.
Hardly anyone questions that this is the appropriate way to interpret contracts,
treaties, wills, and judicial opinions.32 The suggestion that constitutional interpre-
tation should be any different is curious and dangerous. Short of constitutional
amendment, only the Supreme Court itself may alter its prior constitutional
pronouncements. An unelected lawmaking body bound to the intentions of
neither present majorities nor the democratic populace who supplied and con-
tinue to justify its authority bears uncomfortable resemblance to an oligarch.
But what of the “dead hand” problem? As the founding generation itself was
well aware, life is for the living;33 why should that long since deceased
generation’s understandings of the Constitution’s meaning be authoritative to-
day? Originalists will say that the objection proves too much. It is in the nature
of a constitution to limit the will of a present majority. The relevant question is
whether such limitations should be faithful to the intentions of the supermajor-
ity that ratified our governing document or whether they should instead be
divined in some uncertain way by unelected judges.34 It is in our nature to
exercise discretion in favor of our own interests. Interpretation according to
original meaning not only enforces the Constitution’s status as law but also has
the benefit of providing neutral—in the sense of impersonal—criteria to govern
a judge’s exercise of discretion and a reasonably transparent basis upon which
to evaluate judicial acts. “The point,” says Michael McConnell, “is that in
principle the textualist-originalist approach supplies an objective basis for
judgment that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance. And
when errors are made, they can be identified as such, on the basis of profes-
32. See BERGER, supra note 21, at 403; BORK, supra note 22, at 144–45; Michael W. McConnell, The
Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525
(1989) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)); cf. Henry P. Monaghan,
Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 392 (1981) (suggesting that the Constitution’s origins
as a negotiated compact “make plausible, even if they do not compel, a conclusion that constitutional
interpretation should be assimilated to the process of statutory interpretation”).
33. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 593, 593 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999) (“I set out on this ground
which I suppose to be self-evident, ‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living’; that the dead have
neither powers nor rights over it.”).
34. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 704–06
(1976).
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sional, and not merely ideological, criteria.”35
Originalism is democratic, then, not primarily because it binds us to democrati-
cally enacted commitments—this, rather, is why it is consistent with constitution-
alism—but because the limitations it imposes on undemocratic actors preserve
adequate space for democratic decisionmaking.36 Says Robert Bork, “the at-
tempt to adhere to the principles actually laid down in the historic Constitution
will mean that entire ranges of problems and issues are placed off-limits for
judges.”37 And if the Constitution evolves, democracy demands that the custo-
dian of that evolution be the People via the amendment process and via
legislation, not elite lawyers via their own ideological predilections.38
C. WHY NOT ORIGINALISM?
The case against this brand of originalism is more complicated but, to most of
the legal academy, more persuasive. The two most effective theoretical deficien-
cies of originalism relate in varying degrees to the difficulty that time poses for
historicist constitutional methodologies.39 Originalism relies on the notion that
an interpretive anchoring at a particular historical moment inheres in the fact
that the Constitution was indeed written down and ratified at a particular point
in time.40 Unlike background assumptions, unspoken values, shared political
culture, social movement output, or other candidates for the embodiment of our
fundamental rights and governmental structure, a written document invites
comparison to a contract.41 Its reduction to writing seems to resist open-ended
and evolving interpretation in favor of sober interpretive fixation on the under-
standings of the parties at the time of contracting.
This intuition is misleading. The “parties” to our Constitution are the Ameri-
can people as a collective over a 220-year period, which complicates the
analogy between the Constitution and an ordinary contract. It raises profound
questions both as to whether the original understanding can or should give
authoritative guidance and, if so, how exactly one should go about mining that
guidance.
Consider the recent case of Reliable Consultants v. Earle,42 which concerned
35. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Original-
ism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)); see also BORK, supra note 22, at 146–53.
36. See BORK, supra note 22, at 163–64. It bears mention that originalism is not necessarily less
constraining of present majorities. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring); see also infra section III.B.
37. See BORK, supra note 22, at 163.
38. See Scalia, supra note 2, at 854, 862–63; see also McConnell, supra note 32, at 1528–29.
39. There are other objections, of course, which for present purposes I leave aside.
40. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005) (describing the
Constitution as “not merely a text but a deed—a constituting”).
41. See, e.g., id. (“Like the phrases ‘I do’ in an exchange of wedding vows and ‘I accept’ in a
contract, the Preamble’s words actually performed the very thing they described.”).
42. Reliable Consultants v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
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the constitutionality of Texas’s ban on the sale of vibrators. The plaintiff
merchant argued, successfully in the Fifth Circuit, that the statute violated its
customers’ right to sexual privacy.43 Imagine the Supreme Court grants certio-
rari.44 How should a committed originalist vote on the merits? She might first
note that the text of the Constitution does not mention “privacy.” She might on
that basis conclude that there is no such constitutional right and that the lawsuit
should therefore fail. Although Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are apt to
react in this way, originalism does not require that they do. At a minimum, and
bracketing considerations of stare decisis, an originalist will want to know
whether the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to codify a right
comprising the freedom to use sex toys.
Whatever the answer to this inquiry, discretion-limiting it is not. It is difficult
enough for a judge to divine the original ratifying generation’s collective
understanding of an ambiguous constitutional provision. The Constitution was a
negotiated compromise. Those who drafted the document are not the same as
those who ratified it, those who ratified it are not the same as the population at
large, and the various agendas and understandings of its provisions were
wide-ranging and at times contradictory.45 Where Fourteenth Amendment incor-
poration is involved, the task of locating a single original understanding be-
comes nearly impossible. Is our originalist jurist concerned with the founding
generation’s understanding of “liberty” in the Fifth Amendment or the Recon-
struction generation’s understanding of “liberty” in the Fourteenth? Is she
instead concerned with what the 39th Congress thought “privileges or immuni-
ties” included? The people of the ratifying states? Does that include the former
Confederate states (including Texas) that were barred from seating members in
Congress and whose readmittance to the Union was conditioned on accepting
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment? And what if the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ratifying generation was itself originalist? Does she then need to deter-
mine what that generation thought the founding generation thought?46
Putting aside these abstract difficulties, there is always historical practice—
except when there isn’t. The electromechnical vibrator was invented by a
British physician in the 1880s.47 Texas passed its law banning the promotion of
43. Id. at 744.
44. In fact, Texas declined to seek certiorari in the case.
45. See Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 636–37 (1985).
46. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 65, 72 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (suggesting that Justice Scalia and Ronald Dworkin alike lack
sufficient humility about the existence of an “objective” meaning of constitutional provisions and their
ability to discern that meaning); see also Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1033, 1036 (1981) (“To ask, in each instance, whether the framers ‘intended’ the specific or the
general is to pose a question that almost invariably is unanswerable.”).
47. RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: “HYSTERIA,” THE VIBRATOR, AND WOMEN’S
SEXUAL SATISFACTION 15 (1999).
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such devices in 1979.48 Are we to imagine how the American people of 1868
(or 1791?) would have regarded a law against vibrators? The question is
unanswerable. Texas’s law against sex toys resulted from the sexual revolution
of the 1960s, which saw a rediscovery of the vibrator, previously used to relieve
“hysteria” in women, as a sexual gratification device.49 That law is unique to the
culture of the 1970s; to transplant it into the 1860s or 1790s would deprive it of
its oxygen. As Mark Tushnet has observed,
perspectives, beliefs, and intentions are thoroughly interwoven with the con-
crete social and economic realities of [the] day. . . . When interpretivists
presume that they can detach the meanings that the framers gave to the words
they used from the entire complex of meanings that the framers gave to their
political vocabulary as a whole and from the larger political, economic, and
intellectual world in which they lived, interpretivists slip into the error of
thinking that they can grasp historical parts without embracing the historical
whole.50
It will be objected that this sort of indeterminacy is inherent in the project of
interpretation. The constitutional provisions most in need of authoritative inter-
pretation are those whose text is ambiguous and whose application is uncertain.
Originalists do not claim that judging is easy or may be performed with
mathematical precision, only that it is most consistent with constitutional
democracy to use ideologically neutral and transparent criteria. There is a point,
however, at which indeterminacy becomes so paralyzing that originalism can no
longer perform this function.51 If hard cases invite principled disagreement as to
why and how a particular interpretation represents the relevant original mean-
ing, then judicial discretion is not substantially limited and one of originalism’s
principal selling points dissolves.52 And unlike statutes or contracts, for which
the scope of the inquiry into original intent or understanding is relatively
narrow, the Constitution binds for all time, absent an extraordinary political
48. See 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1975; see also Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020 (5th
Cir. 1981). See generally Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology Full Circle: A History of Anti-Vibrator
Legislation in the United States, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326, 330–36 (2006) (describing state
statutes regulating vibrator use).
49. See MAINES, supra note 47, at 3, 20.
50. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 797 (1983); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW:
A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 280 n.7 (1988).
51. See Brest, supra note 28, at 222; Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
469, 478 (1981).
52. See Brest, supra note 28, at 218–19; Tushnet, supra note 50, at 793 (“Interpretivist history
requires both definite answers (because it is part of a legal system in which judgment is awarded to one
side or the other) and clear answers (because it seeks to constrain judges and thereby to avoid judicial
tyranny). The universal experience of historians, however, belies the interpretivists’ expectations.”); see
also Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism 4 (George Washington Univ., Working
Paper No. 393, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1090282 (arguing that originalism’s chame-
leonic nature undermines its normative claims).
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moment. Is it not better, then, that our interpretive regime avail itself of social
and intellectual progress rather than bind us to what we think we know about an
indeterminable past?
A second and perhaps more significant objection to the form of originalism I
have described derives from its implication that the Constitution itself, through
Article V, prescribes the sole method of peaceful amendment.53 This is quite
unlike most ordinary contracts, which customarily may be amended by consent
of the parties, and indeed distinguishes the Constitution from most statutes,
wills, judicial opinions, and other documents to which constitutions have been
too casually compared. Not only is Article V exclusivity an unattractive concep-
tion of constitutional change, but it does not now nor has it ever described our
actual constitutional practice.54 Courts bound by the Supreme Court’s constitu-
tional precedents are not free in our legal culture to regard those precedents as
distinct from what the Constitution “really” contains or contained.55 Nor is the
Supreme Court as a body fond of relying on that distinction in any consistent
way. The Rehnquist Court in particular, in cases such as City of Boerne v.
Flores56 and Dickerson v. United States,57 refused to permit the Court’s constitu-
tional decisions—originalist or otherwise—to be regarded as anything short of
authoritative.
Apart from Supreme Court doctrine, our political culture also recognizes our
authoritative higher law as extending beyond the text and original understand-
ings of our Constitution. Much of what we almost universally believe the
Constitution “contains” diverges from that understanding. A committed histori-
cist could easily conclude that the Court’s privacy and women’s rights decisions
53. Notably, the text of Article V does not declare itself to be the exclusive means of amendment.
54. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457,
1459 (2001) (“[C]onstitutional amendments have not been an important means of changing the
constitutional order.”); cf. Simon, supra note 45, at 613 (“[T]he notion that the Constitution means what
it meant in 1789 has had virtually no currency at all in the Supreme Court during most of this
century.”).
55. This distinction should not be conflated with the distinction between constitutional meaning and
judicial enforcement, which has been the subject of much scholarly debate. Compare Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274
(2006) (arguing for a clear distinction between constitutional rights and judicial remedies), with Daryl J.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (arguing that
constitutional rights are shaped by judicial remedies). I do not mean to say that there is no gap between
what the Constitution contains and what courts are willing to enforce, nor do I believe that judicial
enforcement of constitutional rights is coextensive with the platonic ideal of our constitutional rights.
What I mean, rather, is that there is no gap between that ideal and the Court’s conception of those rights
themselves. That is, to the extent that our Constitution constitutes or is part of our rule of recognition,
Court precedents that actually recognize rights form part of that rule. See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of
Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 659 (1987).
56. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was beyond Congress’s power to legislate under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment because its remedial legislation was not congruent and proportional to unconstitutional
conduct as recognized by the Court).
57. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (rebuking Congress’s effort to legislatively
supercede Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
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are wrong, and that the use of paper money as legal tender, the use of the federal
commerce power to establish the welfare state and federal civil rights laws, and
the federal administrative state itself are all unconstitutional. Yet all of these
doctrinal developments lie beyond any reasonable constitutional objection.58
What is an originalist to make of this fact? Justice Scalia at times succumbs
to stare decisis concerns out of a need, he says, to avoid reinventing the wheel
in every case. “[S]tare decisis is not part of my originalist philosophy,” he
explains, “it is a pragmatic exception to it.”59 Bork, too, does not allow that
stare decisis is a problem for his version of originalism. Because his is a theory
both of interpretation and of adjudication, Bork concedes that a judge who has
determined a particular interpretation to be wrong as a matter of original
understanding has other, practical machinations to go through before deciding
how to proceed. “The previous decision on the subject may be clearly incorrect
but nevertheless have become so embedded in the life of the nation, so accepted
by the society, so fundamental to the private and public expectations of individu-
als and institutions, that the result should not be changed now.”60
Regarding stare decisis as simply a “pragmatic exception” to originalism and
moving on either misunderstands the objection or ignores it. Originalists of the
kind I have discussed in this Part believe the text and original understanding of
the Constitution are binding because that text and that understanding were
popularly ratified through a particular extraordinary democratic process. But it
cannot be that the Constitution continues to bind us for that reason, because all
of those democrats are dead. In order to answer the question of why the
Constitution binds us, and to remain faithful to democratic constitutionalism,
we must ask what we consented to, and continue to assent to, through an
extraordinary democratic process.61 That democratic process cannot be pre-
scribed by the Constitution itself nor indeed can it be prescribed by any a priori
58. See Balkin, supra note 18, at 299; Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in
the Actual Performance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 502 (1996); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 724–39 (1988). See
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000) (applying his theory of amend-
ment outside of Article V to the Reconstruction Amendments and the New Deal).
59. Scalia, supra note 6, at 140.
60. BORK, supra note 22, at 158.
61. See Brest, supra note 28, at 225. There are, of course, normative arguments for constitutional
legitimacy that do not rely on any conception of consent. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Justifying the
Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2104–15 (2001)
(justifying judicial enforcement of the written constitution on the ground that judges are more likely
than legislatures to protect natural rights); Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 157, 162–64
(Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (arguing that constitutional decisions are justified only if they are morally
justified, independent of consent). As these arguments are not typically used to justify originalism, I do
not address them here. But see generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) (arguing that consent is not an appropriate basis for constitutional
legitimacy but that originalism best preserves pre-constitutional liberty rights).
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set of rules, for that would beg the question.62
On those criteria, there is no reason to privilege the process that created the
written Constitution over the one that creates and sustains certain contemporary
constitutional understandings that depart from the original. Hardly anyone of
influence questions the constitutionality of minimum wage laws,63 the National
Labor Relations Act,64 or the social security and federal unemployment insur-
ance systems.65 Their settled constitutionality did not materialize all at once, but
resulted from the political process that produced the Roosevelt presidency and
his Democratic Congresses, and from the absence of either subsequent chal-
lenges to the constitutional rules the New Deal Justices declared or subsequent
political or legal developments that undermined those constitutional rules.66 It is
that sort of acquiescence over time, not formal ratification ages ago, which
constitutes the “consent” necessary to legitimate supreme law on democratic
terms.67 Constitutional interpretive methodologies must account for—and not
just grudgingly tolerate—those developments.68 Stated in terms that are familiar
to legal academics, the theory of originalism fails to resolve the countermajoritar-
ian difficulty. It is not unique among constitutional methodologies in that
respect, but it might be unique in the extent to which it exacerbates that
difficulty (contrary to its claims) by locating the source of judicial authority as
far back in time as possible.
D. NEW ORIGINALISM
It is the odd academic originalist who subscribes to a full-throated version of
the methodology just described and critiqued. That is not to say that what might
be called Scalian originalism is not influential, and, indeed, the next Part
62. See Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127, 1128 (1998) (“No document is authoritative because it says so.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459
(1994) (arguing that “Congress would be obliged to call a convention to propose [constitutional]
revisions if a majority of American voters so petition; and that an amendment or new Constitution
could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the American electorate”). Consider the Constitution
itself, which did not abide by the amendment process prescribed by Article XIII of the Articles of
Confederation.
63. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
64. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
65. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s old-age benefit
provisions); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s
unemployment compensation tax scheme).
66. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 58, at 255–344.
67. Sandalow, supra note 46, at 1050 (“In making [constitutional] decisions, . . . the past to which
we turn is the sum of our history, not merely the choices made by those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution.”); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (stating that, in deciding what
powers are reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment, “[w]e must consider what this country
has become” (emphasis added)).
68. See Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 659 (recognizing that constitutional precedents of the Supreme
Court constitute part of the rule of recognition in the United States). See generally Levinson, supra note
55 (arguing that precedent is more important than originalism for Supreme Court Justices and inferior
court judges).
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demonstrates quite the opposite. What it does say is that over the two decades of
Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court, academics sympathetic to originalism have
filled in some of its theoretical gaps. Few academic originalists, for example,
are nearly as enamored of original expected application (as against original
meaning) as Justice Scalia appears to be in practice.69 McConnell, now a Tenth
Circuit judge, has suggested a richer account of the role that precedent must
play in the constitutional interpretation even of those who take original under-
standing seriously.70 Akhil Amar, whose work might be described as “structural-
ist” in the mold of Charles Black,71 but who has made a career out of rigorous
examination of drafting history and original public meaning, has provocatively
suggested that the Constitution may legitimately be amended by bare majority
outside of the Article V framework.72 That concession, or some other allowance
for the exercise of sovereignty by present majorities, seems to me necessary in
light of the dead-hand critique as I have stated it.
Much of the problem with Scalian originalism arises out of his claim that it is
the only correct mode of constitutional interpretation. Such a statement requires
a rationale grounded in political theory, and the consent-based theory Justice
Scalia relies upon does not adequately justify originalism’s exclusivity. Com-
pare that, however, with John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, who seek to
defend originalism on the pragmatic ground that constitutional rules simply
work better when they are produced by a supermajoritarian process.73 Reliance
on good governance as a justification for originalism emerges from a different,
realist tradition and faces its own set of challenges, but those challenges are
different from the ones Justice Scalia faces.
Randy Barnett and Keith Whittington have helpfully written of what they call
“new” originalism.74 In contrast to Justice Scalia’s defensive, reactionary brand
of originalism, which arose primarily as a criticism of the Warren Court, new
originalism “is more concerned with providing the basis for positive constitu-
tional doctrine than the basis for subverting doctrine.”75 It is more historically
69. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About
Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 384 (2007) (“[A]lmost nobody espouses fidelity to the originally
expected applications.”). But see Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 449 (2007) (“Today’s original meaning originalists often view original expected
applications as very strong evidence of original meaning, even (or perhaps especially) when the text
points to abstract principles or standards.”).
70. See McConnell, supra note 35, at 2417 (arguing that “overwhelming public acceptance consti-
tutes a mode of popular ratification, which gives [long-standing decisions] legitimacy and authority
under the theory of active liberty”). See generally Monaghan, supra note 58.
71. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671 (2002); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextual-
ism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
72. See Amar, supra note 62, at 459.
73. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW.
U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007).
74. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Keith E.
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 608 (2004).
75. Whittington, supra note 74, at 608.
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rigorous, less likely to emphasize judicial restraint, and more genuinely attuned
to original public meaning than to original intent.76 I am not convinced that an
originalist “school” can be identified that has all of these characteristics, but
originalists today have certainly developed more comprehensive, more positive
versions of originalism than Bork’s and Justice Scalia’s.77 These versions of
originalism are less susceptible to (though not wholly immune from) the
critiques I have outlined.
Whether “new” originalists ultimately overcome the theoretical failings I
have identified remains to be seen. Originalism outside of Justice Scalia’s
defensive, critical paradigm has not yet had a complete intellectual vetting.
Undeniably, though, that paradigm has very little currency within today’s legal
academy. The next Part examines a more sympathetic audience.
II. POPULAR ORIGINALISM
In 2005, Mark Levin, an alumnus of the Reagan Justice Department under
Edwin Meese and, of greater moment, an extremely popular radio talk show
host, authored a book called Men in Black: How the Supreme Court Is Destroy-
ing America.78 Using provocative chapter titles79 and prefacing the book with
provocative (not to mention demonstrably false) statements—for example, that
Thurgood Marshall “couldn’t have had a weaker grasp of the Constitution”80—
76. Id. at 607–10.
77. Whittington himself is Exhibit A. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) (arguing that originalism is the
judicial interpretive methodology most appropriate for a government system grounded on popular
sovereignty, but eschewing judicial restraint as a justification for originalism); see also BARNETT, supra
note 61 (arguing that the Constitution is legitimate because it protects the liberty rights retained by the
people and defending originalism as the best way to preserve the Constitution); Balkin, supra note 18
(arguing that original-meaning originalism requires fidelity to the principles embodied in the Constitu-
tion’s generalities and therefore need not be inconsistent with living constitutionalism). It is not
uncommon to see Justice Scalia himself included among the new originalists, owing to his eschewing
of original intent in favor of original public meaning. See, e.g., Posting of Lawrence Solum to Legal
Theory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/06/heller-and-orig.html (June 28, 2008, 10:51
EST). I have no quarrel with the notion that Justice Scalia’s originalism differs in important ways from
that of, say, Berger or Edwin Meese, see supra section I.A, but calling it therefore “new” is another
matter. Justice Scalia articulated a public defense of original-meaning originalism as early as 1986, see
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 22, at 1139–40 (citing Antonin Scalia, Speech Before the Attorney
General’s Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, ORIGINAL
MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 106 (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1987)), long before the term “new
originalism” came into vogue. If there is a new originalism, it inheres not in the proliferation of
original-meaning originalism but in what one might call the depoliticization of originalism. The trends
Whittington and Barnett identify result in large measure from the academic reaction to originalism’s
infiltration of the political sphere. Both conservative and liberal legal scholars have had reason to
articulate putatively politically independent bases for originalism, the former to defend it against
academic attack and the latter to appropriate it for progressive ends. See infra Part IV.
78. MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA (2005).
79. See, for example, Chapter Six (“Endorsing Racism”) and Chapter Eight (“Al Qaeda Gets a
Lawyer”).
80. LEVIN, supra note 78, at 9.
672 [Vol. 97:657THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Levin set about showing that all judges are either originalists or “activists.”81
Rush Limbaugh wrote the introduction, Meese the afterword. The book spent
nine weeks on the New York Times best-seller list, reaching as high as third.82 At
the time of publication, Levin’s radio show was ranked number one in the
evening-commute time slot—in New York City.83
Two years later, self-styled originalist Ilya Somin started a post on a popular
conservative legal blog discussing whether the Air Force is unconstitutional.84
The argument, which Somin sought to rebut, is that Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution grants Congress the power to “raise and support Armies” and to
“provide and maintain a Navy,” but does not expressly permit Congress to
create another standing military branch. Somin did not argue that the Constitu-
tion’s allowance for a federal army and navy was designed to permit the
national government to provide for the common defense85 and that that prin-
ciple permits Congress to establish an analogous air-based fighting force that
the founding generation could not have contemplated.86 Instead, he argued that
two “compelling” answers to the claim of unconstitutionality were, first, that it
may be prohibited to have an independent Air Force but not one that is part of
the Army or Navy, and second, that the Air Force may be created under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.87 Commentators engaged Somin’s argument.
Last Term, the Supreme Court struck down the District of Columbia’s
handgun ban on Second Amendment grounds.88 The Court rejected the argu-
ment that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is inexorably
linked to militia service, despite a sixty-nine-year-old precedent that had been
repeatedly (and recently) cited for that proposition by legions of federal courts.89
81. Id. at 13.
82. See Best Sellers: March 6, 2005, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 22; Best Sellers: April 24, 2005,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, at 26. Men in Black also spent five weeks on Library Journal’s list of most-
borrowed books. See LJ Bestsellers: The Books Most Borrowed in U.S. Libraries, LIBR. J., Sept. 1,
2005, at 200.
83. See Conservative Leads Challenge to the Supreme Court, P.R. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 8, 2005 [hereinaf-
ter Conservative Leads Challenge].
84. Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1170032632.shtml
(Jan. 28, 2007, 19:03 EST).
85. See AMAR, supra note 40, at 43–50 (outlining the Framers’ “geostrategic” vision for the new
nation).
86. There might then be a question of whether Air Force appropriations could last longer than two
years. That limitation was placed on army appropriations out of fear that a standing army was more
threatening than a standing navy. See id. at 115–16; see also id. at 45 (“Unlike navies, armies could be
and were easily used not just to thwart invaders, but also to crush individual freedom and collective
self-government.”).
87. Somin, supra note 84.
88. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
89. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); see United States v. Lewis, 455 U.S. 55,
65 n.8 (1980); Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002); Gillespie v. City of
Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 711 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.
1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124
(4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he lower federal courts have uniformly held that the Second Amendment preserves
a collective, rather than individual, right.”); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992);
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Instead, while conceding that militia composition and readiness was the purpose
behind the Second Amendment, the five-to-four majority concluded that the
original meaning of the Amendment was not limited to that purpose and
controlled the outcome of the case.90
Originalism is in renaissance. The idea that the Constitution should be
interpreted according to its original meaning or the intent of its drafters is not
new, of course, and it would be hyperbolic to say that originalism ever entirely
went away. But as Justice Scalia has noted, many of the Warren Court’s
individual rights decisions, and many of the liberal academic defenses of those
decisions, have been historically anomalous in their open rejection of originalist
methods.91 Bork, too, has lamented that “[w]hat was once the dominant view of
constitutional law—that a judge is to apply the Constitution according to the
principles intended by those who ratified the document—is now very much out
of favor among the theorists of the field.”92
If they ever did, however, professional theorists no longer occupy the entire
field of constitutional law, nor even of constitutional theory. This Part discusses
the salience of originalism outside the academy, within constitutional practice
and popular political discourse. I argue that, while not nearly as dominant as
Justice Scalia would prefer, originalism is by those measures better off now than
when he found it. First, in section II.A, I briefly chronicle the history of
originalism in constitutional argument. Contrary to Scalia’s and Bork’s implica-
tions, the notion that the meaning of constitutional provisions is fixed at the
time of their commitment to text has been viewed with skepticism by influential
constitutional theorists for at least a century. What is new, however, is the
magnitude of political mobilization that has accompanied the originalism move-
ment of which Scalia and Bork are part. I identify the fruits of that mobilization
in section II.B, which discusses Heller and other exemplars of originalism
within contemporary constitutional practice, and section II.C, which discusses
the salience of constitutional methodology outside of academic discourse. What-
ever the state of the academic debate around originalism, originalist arguments
have the capacity to mobilize support around substantive political ends, to
destabilize the legal landscape, and to influence the selection of federal judges.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ORIGINALISM
Reactive originalism, born as it is of an obsession with the perceived patholo-
United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106
(6th Cir. 1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942); see also United States v.
Scanio, No. 97-1584, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29415, at *5 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1998) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is meant solely to protect the
right of the states to keep and maintain armed militia.”(emphasis omitted)).
90. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
91. See Scalia, supra note 2, at 852–54.
92. BORK, supra note 22, at 143. If Bork’s contentious Supreme Court nomination fight is any
measure, originalism was hardly the unanimous preference of the American people of 1987 either.
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gies of living constitutionalism, is largely of twentieth-century vintage, but
grounding legal interpretation in original understanding is not new. Writes
Howard Gillman, buttressing Scalia’s and Bork’s contentions, “From the time of
the founding throughout the nineteenth century, there was a consensus in court
opinions and legal treatises that judges were obligated to interpret the Constitu-
tion on the basis of the original meaning of constitutional provisions.”93 That
proposition is contestable as a descriptive claim about constitutional practice,
but it is certainly the case that strong intentionalist rhetoric was a consistent
theme of Supreme Court opinions throughout the nineteenth century.94 This is
hardly surprising given the generally positivistic tone that dominated nineteenth-
century American legal thought.95 Most infamously, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
Chief Justice Taney relied heavily on his view of original expected application
to sustain his argument that Sanford, born a slave and descended from slaves
but claiming to be a free man,96 was not a “citizen” of the State of Missouri for
the purpose of invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction.97 It did not matter to
Taney that such a reading might be incompatible with contemporaneous notions
of personhood:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in
relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this
country, should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a
more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when
the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be alto-
gether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its
provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument
itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be
construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only
93. Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the
“Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 192
(1997).
94. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 574, 583 (1895) (striking down
the federal income tax based on original intent), vacated, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S.
1, 12 (1887) (“It is never to be forgotten that, in the construction of the language of the Constitution
here relied on, as indeed in all other instances where construction becomes necessary, we are to place
ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed that instrument.”), overruled by
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827)
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (“To say that the intention of the [Constitution] must prevail; that this
intention must be collected from its words, that its words are to be understood in that sense in which
they are generally used by those for whom the instrument was intended; that its provisions are neither
to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor contem-
plated by its framers;—is to repeat what has been already said more at large, and is all that can be
necessary.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803) (stating that there is “no
middle ground” between a “permanent” constitution and legislative supremacy).
95. See P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 245–50 (1991).
96. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393, 403 (1857), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
97. Id. at 454; see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism’s Forgotten Past, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 37, 46 (1993) (calling Taney’s opinion “a riot of originalism”).
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the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to
the Government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to
the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks
not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which
it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and
adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction
would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex
of the popular opinion or passion of the day.98
Taney, that is, was a Scalian originalist. It was sufficiently unusual for nineteenth-
century judges to reason outside the presuppositions of intentionalism that the
Dred Scott dissenters, rather than counterattack with teleological, minimalist, or
dead-hand arguments, chose to dispute only Taney’s tortured reading of original
intent.99
By contrast, Progressive Era thinkers, judges included, were comfortable
applying the metaphor of evolution to the Constitution.100 With Darwin came a
reconsideration of the idea that an organism is now all that it ever was.101
Woodrow Wilson, in his pre-Presidential career as a constitutional theorist,
made explicit the link between Darwinian evolution and national values. “[G]ov-
ernment,” he said, “is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the
theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to
Darwin, not to Newton.”102 The Justices most associated with the Progressive
movement—Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo—rather openly rejected original-
98. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 426.
99. See id. at 532–33 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 572–88 (Curtis, J., dissenting); JOHNATHAN
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW & POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 12–13, 16–17, 20
(2005); Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 44, 48–51 (1993). See generally
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985)
(discussing the early understanding of “original intent of the framers”). The first American treatise
devoted entirely to interpretation was Francis Lieber’s LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (Roy M.
Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Wm. S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1970) (1839). O’NEILL, supra, at 22.
Lieber defined interpretation as “the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words: that is, the
sense which their author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea
which the author intended to convey.” LIEBER, supra, at 23.
100. See Gillman, supra note 93, at 214–16; see also CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1890) (“The binding authority of law . . .
does not rest upon any edict of the people in the past; it rests upon the present will of those who possess
the political power.”).
101. See O’NEILL, supra note 99, at 30 (“The idea of an evolving, adapting law integrated the
broader instrumentalist, updating, and organic tendencies of pragmatic philosophy, Progressive politics,
and Darwinist evolutionary theory.”).
102. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908). Wilson was
parroting the earlier rhetoric of Harvard professor A. Lawrence Lowell. See A. LAWRENCE LOWELL,
ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT 2–3 (1889) (“[A] political system is not a mere machine which can be
constructed on any desired plan, and the parts of which can be adjusted according to the fancy of the
designer. It is far more than this. It is an organism; and in order to appreciate its possible forms and the
causes of its development, stability, or decay, it is necessary to investigate the laws of its organic life.”);
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ism as unable to accommodate the institutional changes brought about by
economic modernization and the rise of the administrative state.103
In the shadow of the Red Scare, the advent of constitutional evolutionism
prompted a reactionary backlash that resulted in the creation of groups devoted
to the preservation of enduring constitutional values. Thus, the Constitution
Anniversary Association formed in 1923 with the goal of designating Septem-
ber 17 as Constitution Day, with a concomitant program of civics education in
schools.104 A cadre of these preservationist groups formed the Sentinels of the
Republic, whose aim was to induce one million people “to pledge themselves to
guard the Constitution and wage war on socialism.”105 The problem, said
former Solicitor General and preservationist James Beck, was that Americans
“at heart, [were] not interested in their Constitution and the spirit of pragmatism
dominate[d] the consideration of every constitutional problem, if and when they
consider[ed] it at all.”106
As Bruce Ackerman and others have detailed, the constitutional crisis pro-
voked by President Roosevelt’s legislative initiatives dramatized the dichotomy
between preservationists and evolutionists.107 Roosevelt resorted frequently to
the rhetoric of living constitutionalism,108 and by the time of his second election
the legal academy was replete with non-originalist scholars.109 Some of these
scholars, such as Harvard’s Felix Frankfurter and Yale’s Thurman Arnold,
would serve in Roosevelt’s administration and on the federal bench. The most
significant non-originalist constitutional triumphs of the 1930s, Home Building
MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF 19–20 (Transaction Publishers rev. ed. 2006)
(1986).
103. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“[G]eneral limitations on the powers of government . . . do not forbid the United States or the states
from meeting modern conditions by regulations which a century ago, or even half a century ago,
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Clauses guaranteeing to the individual
protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing
world.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610
(1914) (Holmes, J.) (“[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form; they are organic, living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their
significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but
by considering their origin and the line of their growth.”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921) (“The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance
that vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees through the transitory particulars and
reaches what is permanent behind them. Interpretation, thus enlarged, becomes more than the ascertain-
ment of the meaning and intent of lawmakers whose collective will has been declared. It supplements
the declaration, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same processes and methods that have built up the
customary law.”).
104. KAMMEN, supra note 102, at 221.
105. Id. at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Gillman, supra note 93, at 227–28.
106. KAMMEN, supra note 102, at 230–31.
107. See ACKERMAN, supra note 58.
108. See O’NEILL, supra note 99, at 32; see also Gillman, supra note 93, at 230 (noting Roosevelt’s
statement in his first inaugural that the “Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always
to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form”).
109. See Gillman, supra note 93, at 234.
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& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell110 and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,111 were met by
strong originalist dissents from Justice Sutherland.112 The Sutherland dissents
differed in important ways, however, from the brand of originalism Justice
Scalia has popularized. The originalist project begun in the 1970s aimed in large
measure to restore power to prosecutors and state legislatures. Justice Suther-
land’s goal, instead, was to curtail the power of the coordinate branches of the
federal government. Thus, in West Coast Hotel, we see Justice Sutherland’s
agitated rebuttal of the charge of judicial activism:
Self-restraint belongs in the domain of will and not of judgment. The check
upon the judge is that imposed by his oath of office, by the Constitution, and
by his own conscientious and informed convictions; and since he has the duty
to make up his own mind and adjudge accordingly, it is hard to see how there
could be any other restraint.113
I argue in section III.D that the mantle of judicial restraint is essential to
originalism’s present political success. It is useful, then, to note that the rhetoric
of restraint has not always been associated with originalism and is hardly an
inevitable feature of it.
Brown v. Board of Education114 must bear some responsibility for that
present association. The Brown Court’s conspicuous disregard for the original
expected application of the Equal Protection Clause cried out for an intellectu-
ally satisfying theory of the case.115 And using the putatively factbound Brown
to outlaw all manner of public segregation in a series of unsigned summary
110. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
111. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
112. See id. at 403 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“[T]o say . . . that the words of the Constitution mean
today what they did not mean when written—that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which
they would have applied then—is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it in
force as the people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made it otherwise.”);
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 453 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“The whole aim of construction, as applied to a
provision of the Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its
framers and the people who adopted it.”).
113. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 402.
114. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. Between the first and second arguments of Brown, the Court requested briefing specifically on
whether “the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures and conventions which ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it
would abolish segregation in public schools.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953). Chief
Justice Warren found the assorted evidence “at best . . . inconclusive” and then declared it irrelevant
anyway: “In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education
in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”
Brown, 347 U.S. at 489, 492–93. The evidence remains (at best) inconclusive. Compare Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decision, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (arguing a more
persuasive originalist justification for the decision in Brown), with Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881,
1881–83 (1995) (arguing that there is no originalist justification for the decision in Brown).
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dispositions did not help matters.116 As liberal academics certain that Brown and
its progeny were correctly decided scrambled to answer skeptics such as
Learned Hand and Herbert Wechsler,117 they of necessity marginalized the
relevance of original expected application to present interpretation. Thus, Alex-
ander Bickel, a Frankfurter clerk during the first Brown argument, insisted that
the level of generality at which we view constitutional principles may be so
broad as to prove the ratifying generation incorrect about specific applica-
tions.118 And Louis Pollak, a member of the Brown legal team, argued that the
original intent of the Equal Protection Clause was for its content to evolve.119
On these theories, original expected application was devalued in the service of
judicial puissance.
Brown could not, of course, do all the work of tying originalism to judicial
restraint. Polite company requires, after all, that constitutional methodologies be
premised on Brown’s correctness, and to my knowledge neither Bork nor Justice
Scalia has ever stated in such company that Brown was wrongly decided.120 The
originalist movement instead addresses its critique primarily at the criminal
procedure,121 First Amendment,122 and substantive due process123 precedents of
the Warren and Burger Courts. It is well to remember that the Warren Court
relied on original intent arguments plenty, including in some of its most
criticized decisions.124 But it is as much what the Warren Court symbolized as
what it actually did that led Raoul Berger, a former New Deal liberal, to
116. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Gayle
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses);
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
117. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54–55 (1958) (arguing that Brown was decided on the
basis of values rather than law); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (1959) (arguing that the Brown Court failed to articulate a neutral principle
justifying the result).
118. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 109–10 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed.
1986) (1962) (“When we find in history, immanent or expressed, principles that we can adopt or adapt,
or ideals and aspirations that speak with contemporary relevance, we find at the same time evidence of
inconsistent conduct. But we reason from the former, not from the frailties of men who, like ourselves,
did not always live up to all they professed or aspired to.”); cf. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64 (1955) (suggesting that the
content of the Equal Protection Clause intentionally “was left to future determination”).
119. See Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Response to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1959) (musing, in an alternative writing of Brown, that the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment “contemplat[es] an essentially dynamic development by Congress and
this Court of the liberties outlined in such generalized terms in the Amendment”).
120. See BORK, supra note 22, at 74–83 (arguing that Brown was correctly decided even though
inconsistent with original understanding).
121. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
122. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
123. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1963).
124. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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conclude that America had by its bicentennial devolved into “government by
judiciary.”125 Johnathan O’Neill does not exaggerate in saying that Berger’s
book of that title, which argued vociferously for a return to Fourteenth Amend-
ment decisions grounded in original intent, “had an explosive effect on constitu-
tional debate in the late 1970s and 1980s.”126 Berger believed that liberal
academics, “floating on a cloud of post-Warren Court euphoria,” had blinded
themselves to the dangers of an unrestrained Judiciary.127
While academics busied themselves mostly attacking and only occasionally
defending Berger’s critique, disaffected conservatives were recognizing a tem-
plate for their recapture of the Federal Judiciary. Berger’s book presaged the
conservative political tide that swept Ronald Reagan into office and in 1980
gave Republicans control of the Senate for the first time in twenty-six years.
Republicans pushed two strategies for reining in the federal bench. The first
tack, court-stripping legislation, was a failure. Measures were introduced during
Reagan’s first term to limit federal court jurisdiction over school prayer,128
busing,129 and abortion130 cases and to repeal the incorporation doctrine, the
exclusionary rule, and federal question jurisdiction in the district courts.131
None of those bills succeeded.
The second tack was subtler and more effective. As Paul Bator, who served as
Deputy Solicitor General under Rex Lee, wrote in response to the court-
stripping movement, withdrawing the Court’s jurisdiction because it makes
decisions Congress does not like “is a technique of dealing with the Court that
adopts the Court’s own disregard of the Constitution’s structural spirit.”132 It is
far better that criticism of the Court exploit Americans’ reverence for separation
of powers by developing and deploying arguments internal to jurisprudence.
That was the mission of organizations like the Federalist Society, founded in
1982, and the Center for Judicial Studies, which in 1983 began publishing
Benchmark, a bi-monthly opinion journal that promoted originalism as a means
of reining in the Court.133
After Reagan’s landslide re-election, Meese replaced William French Smith
as Attorney General and immediately set about making fidelity to original intent
a subject of popular political discourse.134 There was no ambiguity in Meese’s
message: a jurisprudence of original intent was essential to judicial restraint.
125. See BERGER, supra note 21.
126. O’NEILL, supra note 99, at 123–24.
127. BERGER, supra note 21, at 4–5.
128. S. 784, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 183, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 253, 98th Cong. (1983).
129. S. 139, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 798, 98th Cong. (1983).
130. S. 26, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 210, 98th Cong. (1983).
131. S. 3018, 97th Cong. (1982).
132. Paul M. Bator, Withdrawing Jurisdiction from Federal Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31,
31 (1984).
133. See O’NEILL, supra note 99, at 129–30; Steven G. Calabresi, Introduction to ORIGINALISM: A
QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 1 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
134. See O’NEILL, supra note 99, at 154.
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And, in turn, judicial restraint was essential to democratic self-government. In
an early speech before the American Bar Association, Meese said that “[t]o
allow the courts to govern simply by what it [sic] views at the time as fair and
decent, is a scheme of government no longer popular; the idea of democracy has
suffered.”135 It would therefore be the policy of the Reagan Justice Department
“to resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes as the
only reliable guide for judgment.”136 Meese’s well-publicized series of speeches
in 1985 and 1986 generated voluminous debate both within the legal academy
and in popular publications,137 and prompted public responses from Justices
Brennan and Stevens.138
Deliberately and provocatively, Meese’s public promotion of originalism set
the stage for the nomination of Bork to replace Lewis Powell on the Supreme
Court in 1987. A few months earlier, the Republican-controlled Senate had
confirmed William Rehnquist as Chief Justice and Scalia to fill Rehnquist’s seat.
With Democrats having obtained a Senate majority in the 1986 midterm elec-
tions, and with the Court’s swing vote in the balance, the Bork nomination was
a test of conservatives’ originalism strategy. The public’s attention had focused
on the Court’s personnel before, most famously during the New Deal era. But
never before had the public debate focused so intently on methodology per se.
As Robert Post and Reva Siegel write, “Although Americans have traditionally
incorporated assertions about constitutional text and history into both liberal
and conservative arguments, it is almost unknown for a general theory of
constitutional interpretation to itself become a site for popular mobilization.”139
Americans spent the summer of 1987 debating constitutional methodology,
precisely as Meese and his allies wanted.
Meese could not have been pleased with the immediate result of his efforts—
Bork’s spectacular defeat—but the long-term scorecard is more encouraging. As
Randy Barnett has noted, the conventional storyline is that originalism’s theoreti-
cal bona fides were fatally undermined by the hermeneutic and historical
critiques of scholars such as Brest and H. Jefferson Powell,140 and the failed
Bork nomination laid bare originalism’s inability to gain currency with the
public. This tale is incomplete. To be sure, the originalism trumpeted by Meese
and Bork is, as I have discussed, non gratus within much of the legal academy,
and most of the public does not understand the original expected application of
constitutional provisions to be the only legitimate interpretive guide.141 But
135. Meese, supra note 14, at 465.
136. Id. at 465–66.
137. See O’NEILL, supra note 99, at 156–57.
138. See Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12,
1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 11 (1986) [hereinafter GREAT
DEBATE]; Justice John Paul Stevens, Speech Before the Federal Bar Association (Oct. 23, 1985), in
GREAT DEBATE, supra, at 27 (1986).
139. Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 548.
140. See BARNETT, supra note 61, at 89–91.
141. See supra section I.C; infra text accompanying notes 219–24.
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using historicist arguments to enforce an ideal of judicial restraint, to achieve
political goals, and to re-orient settled legal practice is alive and well.
B. ORIGINALISM IN PRACTICE
United States v. Miller involved the prosecution of two men for carrying an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun across the border from Oklahoma into Arkansas
in violation of the National Firearms Act.142 The men argued successfully in the
district court that the Act was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.143
The Supreme Court heard the case on direct appeal and reversed in a unanimous
opinion. Justice McReynolds wrote for the Court that the “obvious purpose” of
the Second Amendment was to effectuate the Militia Clause and that the
Amendment “must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”144 Be-
cause there was no evidence in the record that the possession or use of a
sawed-off shotgun “at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preserva-
tion or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,” there was no warrant to hold the
Act unconstitutional.145
Miller is not a model of clarity. It could be read for the proposition that the
Second Amendment is only enforceable on behalf of individuals rendering or
training for militia service. It could also be read as guaranteeing the right to
keep and bear arms to a broader set of individuals but only insofar as their
weapons are relevant to a well-regulated militia.146 It could even be read as
holding that only regulations that frustrate the Militia Clause—that is, state but
not federal regulation of firearms—violate the Second Amendment, though that
reading would be inconsistent with the notion that the Bill of Rights was
intended as a limitation upon Congress.
Until 1999, no federal court had read Miller as embracing an individual right
to keep and bear arms unqualified by militia readiness. In United States v.
Lewis, the Supreme Court said, citing Miller, that a federal ban on firearm
possession by felons does not “trench upon any constitutionally protected
liberties.”147 Because the felon-in-possession statute covers muskets, gunpow-
der, bullets, and other ordnance, the implication can be drawn that the Second
Amendment does not confer rights on civilians against the federal govern-
142. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 174–75 (1939); see National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236
(1934) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006)).
143. Miller, 307 U.S. at 177.
144. Id. at 178 (“With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effective-
ness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made.”). The Militia
Clause reads: “The Congress shall have power . . . . [t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplin-
ing, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
145. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
146. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814 (2008).
147. United States v. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
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ment.148 Ten federal Courts of Appeals have taken a “collective rights” view of
the Amendment, holding or implying that it only protects the rights of the States
to maintain armed militias, and until 2001 none had adopted a contrary posi-
tion.149 Such was the consensus on that view that former Chief Justice Warren
Burger declared in a 1991 television interview that grounding opposition to gun
control legislation in a putative Second Amendment right was “one of the
greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the American public by
special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime.”150 As Carl Bogus
has written, “If there is such a thing as settled constitutional law, the Second
Amendment may have been its quintessential example.”151
In 1999, Judge Sam R. Cummings, a Reagan appointee sitting in the North-
ern District of Texas, held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits firearm
possession by a person subject to a temporary restraining order, violated the
Second Amendment.152 Judge Cummings acknowledged, understating things,
that “several other federal courts have held that the Second Amendment does
not establish an individual right to keep and bear arms, but rather a ‘collective’
right, or a right held by the states.”153 He nevertheless concluded that “[a]
historical examination of the right to bear arms, from English antecedents to the
drafting of the Second Amendment, bears proof that the right to bear arms has
consistently been, and should still be, construed as an individual right.”154 A
panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, but not before agreeing with the district
court that the Second Amendment confers an individual right.155 The court
conceded that “almost all of our sister circuits have rejected any individual
rights view of the Second Amendment,” but it concluded that those opinions did
so “either on the erroneous assumption that Miller resolved that issue or without
sufficient articulated examination of the history and text of the Second Amend-
ment.”156 Six years later the D.C. Circuit also came around to the individual
rights view and struck down the District’s handgun ban in an opinion written by
148. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961) (citing Miller for the
proposition that the Second Amendment should not be read literally).
149. See supra note 89.
150. MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: First Freedoms (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16, 1991).
151. Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (2000); cf. Chris Mooney, Showdown: Liberal Legal Scholars Are Supporting
the Right To Bear Arms. But Will Historians Shoot Them Down?, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 2000, at 26, 32
(quoting Akhil Amar’s view that the collective rights view “might be false as a matter of historical fact
but nonetheless true as a matter of constitutional law”).
152. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d, 270 F.3d 203 (5th
Cir. 2001).
153. Id. at 607.
154. Id. at 602.
155. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264–65 (5th Cir. 2001). That portion of the opinion
was joined only by Judge Garwood, a Reagan appointee and the opinion’s author, and Judge DeMoss,
appointed by the first President Bush. Judge Parker, a Clinton appointee, specially concurred to say that
the “individual rights” discussion was dicta and need not be followed by any court. Id. at 272 (Parker,
J., specially concurring).
156. Id. at 227.
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Judge Silberman, also a Reagan appointee.157
That case gave us Heller. It is fashionable among legal academics to refer to
Heller as a significant triumph for originalism.158 It is a victory, to be sure,
though perhaps not of the magnitude or for the reasons sometimes cited. Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion is, as explained below, as fixated on originalism as
any this country’s High Court has ever produced. That conceded, much of the
early scholarly attention that followed Heller has burrowed in on the dissenting
opinions, particularly that of Justice Stevens, who, it is said, tried unsuccess-
fully to beat Scalia at his own game. Dale Carpenter’s posting on the Volokh
Conspiracy under the subheading, “We’re all originalists now,” was typical of
many: “Stevens might not be a very accomplished originalist, or you might
think he was wrong in this instance, but the mere fact that he and the three who
joined him paid such obeisance to originalism on a matter of constitutional first
impression confirms again its ascendance as a methodology.”159 That reading of
the dissent risks confusing historicism with original-meaning originalism; the
Stevens dissent is awash in the former but, best read, only flirts with the latter. It
is nonetheless significant that the public face of Heller and of the resolution of
the Second Amendment issue more generally is an abidingly originalist one.
The Heller majority opinion’s rejection of the collective rights view is
originalist to its core. At least three layers of original-meaning originalism are
on display. First, the opinion specifically and repeatedly announces that the
original understanding of the Second Amendment’s text rather than the purpose
behind its codification controls the Court’s interpretation.160 Justice Scalia’s key
move, and the one that most fundamentally divides the majority opinion from
157. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395 (2007).
158. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest example of what is now called ‘original
public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”); Posting of Lawrence Solum to
Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/06/heller-and-the.html (June 28, 2008,
10:50 EST) (“The opinion of the Court by Justice Scalia provides the clearest expression of public
meaning originalism to be found in a Supreme Court decision.”).
159. Heller on a First Read, Posting of Dale Carpenter to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
posts/1214514180.shtml (June 26, 2008, 17:03 EST); see also Some Preliminary Reflections on Heller,
Posting of Sandy Levinson to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/some-preliminary-
reflections-on-heller.html (June 26, 2008, 17:47 EST) (“One of the most remarkable features of Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion . . . and Justice Stevens’s dissent . . . is the view that the Second Amendment
means only what it meant at the time of its proposal and ratification in 1789–91. Justice Scalia, of
course, has long been identified with ‘originalism’ . . . . But Justice Stevens has certainly not embraced
originalism. Yet they spend a total of 110 pages debating arcane aspects of the purported original
meaning of the Amendment.”); More on Heller, Posting of Mark Tushnet to Balkinization, http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/more-on-heller.html (June 27, 2008, 9:57 EST) (“Both Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court and Justice Stevens’s dissent devote a great deal of attention to the original
understanding—or, as it turns out, understandings—of the Second Amendment’s terms.”).
160. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008) (suggesting that the meaning
of the Second Amendment is that which would have been “known to ordinary citizens in the founding
generation”); id. at 2805 (arguing that post-ratification history is relevant “to determine the public
understanding” of the text); id. at 2810 (justifying his use of post-Civil War sources based solely on the
fact that it reflects the views of those “born and educated in the early 19th century”); see also id. at
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Justice Stevens’s dissent, is to declare that the militia-related purpose an-
nounced by the Amendment’s prefatory clause does not limit the meaning of the
operative clause.161 For Justice Scalia, the meaning of the text essentially
decides the case; the purpose behind the Amendment is only evidence of
meaning where meaning is otherwise ambiguous.162 For Justice Stevens, by
contrast, the motivation behind the Amendment is the chief end of interpreta-
tion, and the text is simply strong evidence of that motivation; the purpose the
prefatory clause declares may therefore introduce, and not merely resolve,
textual ambiguity.163
To wit, Justice Scalia readily concedes that enactment of the Second Amend-
ment was motivated by considerations of militia composition and readiness.164
But because, on Scalia’s view, the purpose-announcing prefatory clause “does
not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause,”165 it is the latter whose
meaning controls the case. And by dint of his own analysis of contemporaneous
dictionaries and analogous wording elsewhere in the Bill of Rights and in state
constitutions,166 Justice Scalia determines that the operative clause rather unam-
biguously “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in
case of confrontation.”167 On this analysis, once that guarantee is established by
grammatical scrutiny, only directly contrary purpose or precedent may upset
it.168 The majority opinion mentions Miller just once (and even then, not to
address its import as precedent) in the first twenty-six pages of the opinion. It’s
as if original meaning called “Shotgun!”
Justice Scalia’s startlingly textualist reading of Miller itself is Heller’s second
layer of original-meaning originalism. The “holding” of the Miller Court is that
2817 (“[T]he fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause
and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.”).
161. Id. at 2801.
162. Id. at 2789–90 (“While we will begin our textual analysis with the operative clause, we will
return to the prefatory clause to ensure that our reading of the operative clause is consistent with the
announced purpose.”).
163. Id. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The preamble thus both sets forth the object of the
Amendment and informs the meaning of the remainder of the text.”). This critical distinction reprises
the two Justices’ long-running debate over textualism versus purposivism in the context of ordinary
statutory interpretation. Compare Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1549
(2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“As long as [the] driving policy [behind policy-driven interpretation]
is faithful to the intent of Congress (or . . . aims only to give effect to such intent)—which it must be if
it is to override a strict interpretation of the text—the decision is also a correct performance of the
judicial function.”), with id. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Contrary to the Court and Justice Stevens,
I do not believe that what we are sure the Legislature meant to say can trump what it did say.”).
164. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789, 2801 (majority opinion).
165. Id. at 2789.
166. Supplemented, it must be said, with a dose of ipse dixit.
167. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
168. See id. at 2799 (“Before turning to limitations upon the individual right, however, we must
determine whether the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports with our interpretation of
the operative clause.”); id. at 2812 (discussing case law only to determine “whether any of our
precedents forecloses the conclusions we have reached about the meaning of the Second Amendment”).
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[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of
a [sawed-off shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instru-
ment.169
A literal reading of those words, and indeed their meaning circa 1939, arguably
supports Justice Scalia’s rendering of Miller as a statement about which kinds of
weapons one has a Second Amendment right to keep and bear, rather than about
the ends to which one may keep and bear those weapons.170 An analysis of the
telos of the opinion does not, however, bear that limitation. The Miller Court
said that the Second Amendment “must be interpreted and applied” with a view
toward its “obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness” of the militia.171 If the Court meant only that the Second Amend-
ment does not apply to arms that have no military purpose, it chose an unduly
capacious way of saying so. As Justice Stevens notes, adopting Justice Scalia’s
reading would naturally have prompted the Miller Court to inquire whether a
sawed-off shotgun could be used for some legitimate non-military purpose,
which it did not do.172 In atomistically divorcing the language of the Miller
opinion from the obvious intent of its drafters—and from the meaning given it
by legions of federal courts—Justice Scalia imposes the same methodological
limitations on his reading of precedent as on his reading of constitutional text.
The third, perhaps most ambitious, layer of originalism evident in Heller lies
in the majority’s suggestion that Miller’s precedential weight is diminished by
its failure to discuss the history of the Second Amendment with sufficient
rigor.173 When stare decisis becomes stare originalist, we have reached a high
and unprecedented plane of historicism indeed.
Justice Stevens’s contribution to Heller’s originalist moment is not the dis-
sent’s methodology, which on close reading is hardly unorthodox, but rather its
failure to trumpet the revolutionary nature of the majority’s approach. Although
Justice Stevens is not nearly as explicit about his methodology as Justice Scalia,
he makes clear that his principal interpretive guides are the purpose behind the
Second Amendment—as identified by the text of both the preamble and the
169. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
170. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814.
171. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
172. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2845 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814–15 (majority opinion); cf. id. at 2824 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(referring to the majority’s “feeble attempt to distinguish Miller that places more emphasis on the
Court’s decisional process than on the reasoning in the decision itself”). As to other Supreme Court
precedents such as Lewis, Justice Scalia rejects the collective rights view suggested in that opinion by
saying, “It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee
of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was
not argued.” Id. at 2816 n.25 (majority opinion). One page later, he rejects Justice Breyer’s suggested
Second Amendment reasonableness standard based on a footnoted dictum from United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27.
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operative clause—and stare decisis. He does dispute Justice Scalia’s reading of
the operative clause,174 but quite unlike Justice Scalia, that clause is not the end
of the matter: “Even if the meaning of the text were genuinely susceptible to
more than one interpretation, the burden would remain on those advocating a
departure from the purpose identified in the preamble and from settled law to
come forward with persuasive new arguments or evidence.”175 Justice Stevens’s
turn to history176 and his occasional references to the intent of the Framers177
are best read as supporting his purposive approach to interpretation of both
statutes and constitutions.178 Purposive analysis, which seeks dynamically to
give effect to the aims that animated the statute, is distinct from strict intentional-
ism, which aims instead to be faithful to the expectations of the legislature.179
This distinction is not well understood outside of the legal academy. Had
Justice Stevens more forcefully identified his own methodology as hewing to
the Court’s traditional eclectic mix of purpose and precedent, contrasting it
explicitly with Justice Scalia’s doctrinaire textualism, Heller might well have
stood for the proposition that Scalia’s originalism can garner five votes in some
cases but remains fundamentally contested. Instead, much of the reaction to the
case was premised on the mistaken notion that the Justices agreed on methodol-
ogy but split only on their reading of history.180 Politicians took the opportunity
to praise Justice Scalia’s faithfulness to original “intent,”181 and commentators
either lauded or attacked each side’s application of that approach.182 Whether or
174. The surest sign of the ambiguity of the operative clause is that both the majority and the
dissenters read it as unambiguous. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Scott v.
Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1785 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If two groups of judges can disagree so
vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it seems
eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s characterization of events.”).
175. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2831.
176. Id. at 2824–36.
177. See, e.g., id. at 2822 (“[T]here is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to
enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.”); id. at 2841 (criticizing the
majority on the ground that post-enactment statements “cannot possibly supply any insight into the
intent of the Framers”).
178. See id. at 2835 (“Madison’s initial inclusion of an exemption for conscientious objectors sheds
revelatory light on the purpose of the Amendment.”).
179. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14, 25–26 (1994).
180. See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 35 (“[Justice Stevens’s opinion] leaves the impression that all that
divided the two wings of the Court was a disagreement over the historical record.”).
181. See, e.g., Rep. Price Lauds Landmark Second Amendment Decision, U.S. FED. NEWS, June 26,
2008 (quoting Tom Price, R-Ga.: “It is the benchmark by which all future cases regarding the Second
Amendment will be gauged and validates the intent of our Founding Fathers.”); Rep. Young Lauds
Overturning of D.C. Gun Ban, U.S. FED. NEWS, June 26, 2008 (quoting Don Young, R-Alaska: “I am
incredibly pleased today that finally, the freedoms created by the Second Amendment will apply to all
citizens in our Nation’s capital. The original intent of the Second Amendment was to protect each
individual’s right to keep and bear arms.”).
182. See, for example, the statement of former New Jersey attorney general John Farmer, Jr.: “The
problem for the majority opinion and for its ‘original intent’ foundation is that Justice Stevens’ dissent
looks at precisely the same evidence and reaches the opposite conclusion.” John Farmer, Jr., The
Ongoing Duel About Guns: A Living Constitution vs. ‘Originalism,’ NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, July 6,
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not Justice Stevens’s dissent could be characterized as an original-intent opin-
ion, the only way both his opinion and the majority’s could be understood as
engaged in the same interpretive enterprise is if original intent and original
meaning are but two sides of the same interpretive coin. That is untrue as a
matter of constitutional theory but true as a matter of constitutional politics.
Indeed, no issue better illustrates the cleavage between the academic and
public lives of originalism than the Second Amendment. That the only four
federal court opinions since Miller to hold that the Amendment confers an
essentially unqualified individual right to keep and bear arms were originalist
opinions written by Reagan appointees is a better measure of Meese’s success
than the arguments, however strong, of Brest and other critics in the legal
academy. The Second Amendment movement is an example of how, as Post and
Siegel have argued, “[o]riginalism uses political and litigation strategies to
infuse the law of the Constitution with contemporary political meanings that
originalists find compelling.”183 The National Rifle Association had never
endorsed a presidential candidate until it backed Reagan days before the 1980
election.184 The tying of the gun rights lobby to the national Republican Party
and political conservatism gained significant momentum throughout the 1980s,
just in time for the originalism debate to reach its peak. That decade witnessed
an explosion in the number of academic arguments addressing the Second
Amendment generally and advocating the individual rights view specifically.
According to research conducted by Robert Spitzer, only 9 of the 39 articles
published through 1980 adopted that position, compared to 21 of the 38
published in the 1980s and 58 of the 87 published in the 1990s.185 Many of
those individual rights arguments, overwhelmingly originalist, were in turn
cited by George W. Bush’s Justice Department when it formally adopted the
individual rights view in 2004,186 and by Reagan’s judicial appointees when
2008; see also E.J. Dionne, The D.C. Handgun Ruling: Originalism Goes Out the Window, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2008, at A17 (arguing that the majority opinion is not “an honest attempt to determine the
‘original’ intention of the Constitution’s authors”); Bryan Hendricks, Historical Context of Second
Amendment Validated, ARK. DEM.-GAZETTE, July 6, 2008, at 12C (describing Heller as “affirm[ing] the
amendment’s original intent”); Colin McNickle, On Second Thought . . ., PITT. TRIB.-REV., June 29,
2008 (suggesting that Justice Scalia’s view was consistent with original intent); Meg Mott, On Guns
and Kings, BRATTLEBORO REFORMER, July 1, 2008 (“Scalia usually categorizes his method of interpreta-
tion as original intent.”); Editorial, Original Intent and Right To Bear Arms, N.J. LAWYER, July 21,
2008, at 6 (suggesting that all three Heller opinions debated original intent and attributing to the
majority the view that “original intent is . . . dispositive”); David Reinhard, Guns and Judges: How in
Heller Is This Judicial Activism?, OREGONIAN, July 3, 2008, at C7 (saying the opposite of Dionne);
Editorial, Ruling Only Rekindles Debate over Gun Rights, DES MOINES REG., June 29, 2008, at 10P
(arguing that Justice Scalia “disingenuously misread” the original intent of the Framers).
183. Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 560.
184. See Dudley Clendinen, Soaps, Guns, and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1980, at B14.
185. Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
349, 367–68 (2000).
186. Compare Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, Op. Off. Legal
Counsel (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.pdf, and Letter from John Ashcroft, Att.
Gen. to James Jay Baker, Executive Dir., National Rifle Association (May 17, 2001), http://
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they set about making the individual rights view “true” as a matter of constitu-
tional law.
Originalists seek to alter the hierarchy of constitutional argument. It is hoped
that, in select cases, prima facie interpretation will be established by historicist
moves at the expense of precedent or, at times, purpose, policy, structure, or
even text.187 In Heller, that meant devoting the bulk of the majority opinion to
original meaning and relegating precedent to, in effect, an affirmative de-
fense.188 In Printz v. United States,189 which invalidated the so-called comman-
deering provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act190 on largely
originalist grounds, Justice Scalia was explicit that, in the absence of textual
guidance, the Court would seek answers in “historical understanding and prac-
tice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court
. . . in that order.”191 None of which is to say that originalists necessarily act in
bad faith. Certain of Justice Scalia’s originalist triumphs reflect what appears to
be a genuine populism that does not always hue to traditional partisan lines.
Both Crawford v. Washington192 and Apprendi v. New Jersey,193 for example,
used original meaning arguments to the immediate benefit of criminal defen-
dants. The relevant “contemporary political meaning” in each case was a
devotion to formalism and an aversion to judicial discretion, in Crawford to
determine the reliability of testimonial hearsay and in Apprendi to find certain
sentencing facts. Heller, Crawford, and Apprendi exemplify a remarkable turn
in constitutional law wherein originalist arguments are used not to restrain
constitutional updating but to overrule longstanding precedential lines with
substantial reliance interests at stake. It was Meese’s aim to endow originalism
with that affirmative power, the capacity not just to resist but actually to
motivate constitutional change, and in that respect his efforts have been at least
a qualified success.
Originalist arguments appear to find an increasingly receptive audience on
the federal bench. According to research conducted by the Harvard Law School
www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf, with Margaret E. Sprunger, Comment, D.C. as a Breeding Ground
for the Next Second Amendment Test Case: The Conflict Within the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 53 CATH.
U. L. REV. 577, 577 n.3 (2004) (quoting a letter from former Solicitor General Seth Waxman
advocating the collective rights view). Notably, the Ashcroft letter suggests that the individual rights
view is consistent with original intent.
187. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (“To rest on the words of the [Eleventh]
Amendment alone would be to engage in the type of ahistorical literalism we have rejected in
interpreting the scope of the States’ sovereign immunity since the discredited decision in Chisholm.”).
188. Likewise, even in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), one of last Term’s most
conspicuously non-originalist opinions, the Court concluded that the availability of habeas corpus does
not depend on formal sovereignty only after determining that the evidence of historical practice at the
time of the founding was inconclusive. See id. at 2251.
189. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
190. Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 42 U.S.C.).
191. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (emphasis added).
192. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004).
193. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000).
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Federalist Society, between 1957 and 1986 only three federal court decisions
referenced founding-era dictionaries. Over that period, the average number of
federal court decisions referencing The Federalist grew more or less steadily
from 2.80 in the five years from 1957 to 1961 to 21.20 in the five years from
1982 to 1986. Both practices appear to have grown dramatically since then. In
each of the four semi-decanal periods from 1987 to 2006—representing Justice
Scalia’s tenure on the Supreme Court—the number of founding-era dictionary
references has been, respectively, 6, 11, 5, and 24; the average number of
references to The Federalist has been 31.80, 43.00, 40.00, and 37.40. The trend
is less dramatic with respect to references to records of the Philadelphia
Convention or the state ratifying conventions. Over each of the five five-year
periods from 1957 to 1981, the number of references to the conventions in
federal court decisions has been, respectively, 5, 16, 18, 30, and 29. In the five
semi-decanal periods since, the number of such references has been 42, 40, 33,
33, and 32, respectively.194
I do not make too much of this data; statistical averages are notoriously
suspect, and it is difficult to draw confident conclusions from these data without
also compiling, for example, the number of cases reaching the merits of a
constitutional question over each semi-decanal period. These numbers do,
however, appear to conform to what one would expect given Meese’s efforts to
reform the Federal Judiciary. As much as ever, originalist arguments are able to
legitimate political ends by dressing them in a widely accepted form of constitu-
tional argument. Even if making originalism the sole acceptable means of
constitutional interpretation is wholly aspirational, legitimating and calcifying a
particular hierarchy of constitutional argument is within the realm of the
possible.
C. THE SALIENCE OF METHODOLOGY
A second outgrowth of the originalism movement of the 1970s and 1980s is
increased public attention to constitutional methodology generally and to origi-
nalism in particular. The results of the Supreme Court’s cases and the composi-
tion of its membership have often been the subject of conventional political
discourse, but methodology qua methodology has rarely been such a salient
feature of the public discussion about the Federal Judiciary. This is so in part
because of the increased visibility of and interest group participation in the
Senate confirmation hearings, wherein “judicial philosophy” has become, in the
words of Christopher Eisgruber, the “Holy Grail.”195 Moreover, with the prolif-
eration of legal blogs, talk radio, and twenty-four–hour cable news channels, the
194. These data are on file with the author. There is sense in the observed decline in constitutional
convention references after a steady rise. As I have discussed, since the mid-1980s originalists have
deemphasized the significance of original intent, for which convention debates are most probative, in
favor of original meaning.
195. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS 98 (2007).
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potential audience for constitutional methodology is as broad as it has ever
been.
There is no doubt that public participation and interest in the confirmation
process has risen dramatically over the last three decades.196 The Senate did not
open floor debate on federal court nominations until 1929; nominees did not
testify as a matter of course before 1955; and interest groups did not regularly
participate in the confirmation process until the Nixon presidency.197 As Rich-
ard Davis writes, “Until the latter part of the twentieth century, most nomina-
tions involved exclusively the White House, the Senate, and legal community
leaders. Public controversy over nominees erupted on occasion, but typically
the debate was joined by a relatively small number of insiders.”198 The confirma-
tion battles over the two most recently confirmed Justices, Roberts and Alito,
were the subject of fifty-two and fifty-six stories respectively on the three
major-network evening newscasts. With the exception of Clarence Thomas,
who was confirmed by a four-vote margin following controversy over his
alleged sexual harassment of Anita Hill, no confirmed Justice since Thurgood
Marshall has received as much coverage.199
With increased attention to the Court nomination process comes increased
attention to methodology. As Appendix B demonstrates, references to the
original intent of the Framers and to originalism spiked dramatically in the
Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal during the
confirmation hearings of Bork and Roberts. The terms “originalism” or “original-
ist” appeared in those three publications a total of eighty-five times in the
three-year period from 2005 to 2007. By contrast, those terms appeared in the
three publications just seventy-six times in the twenty-one–year period from
1984 to 2004. The term “original intent” appeared in the same sentence as the
word “Framers” twenty-four times from 2005 to 2007 and 109 times from 1986
to 1991, which spanned Meese’s originalism movement and the Bork hearing.
In the intervening thirteen-year period from 1992 to 2004, in which the only
two nominees to the Court were consensus picks by a Democratic president, the
term “original intent” appeared in the same sentence as “Framers” twenty-seven
times.
Originalism is the most prominent recent frame to the now-familiar nomina-
tion rite wherein Senators try to induce nominees to articulate a “judicial
philosophy,” hoping it will provide a window into the nominee’s political
commitments.200 What is different about originalism is that, unlike, for ex-
196. See, e.g., Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 13, at 16 (“In the past, it was relatively rare for the
mass public to play much of a role [in judicial confirmation battles]. Today, one of the crucial elements
in confirmation strategies concerns how public opinion will be managed and manipulated.”).
197. See JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 36–37, 89, 109 (1995).
198. RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS 15 (2005).
199. These data are generated from the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive and are
reported in Appendix A.
200. See MALTESE, supra note 197, at 109.
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ample, “judicial activism” or “strict constructionism,” originalism has content
within the discourse of legal professionals.201 I examined the twenty-eight
nomination hearings conducted since that of John Marshall Harlan II in 1955,
when testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee became routine. I
studied the Senators’ relative interest in methodology during the hearings before
the judiciary committee. I counted the total number of questions asked of each
nominee and the total number that concerned constitutional methodology.202 I
coded as “methodological” questions about whether the Constitution is a rigid
and fixed document or should be updated over time; the role of stare decisis in
constitutional adjudication; whether judges should ever act as legislators or
make policy decisions; whether a judge’s personal views of justice or morality
should influence his decisions; whether the difficulty of Article V amendment
justifies changing established constitutional decisions; what role foreign law
should play in constitutional interpretation; the importance of constitutional
avoidance; and equivalent or related questions. More generally, I was interested
in questions about how a nominee approaches constitutional cases, as opposed
to what kinds of results he prefers in particular categories of cases or how he
would shape doctrine in specific areas.
My observations suggest that interest in methodology has been most signifi-
cant in the aftermath of substantial criticism of the Court’s decision in Brown
and its progeny, during the Bork hearing, and during the recent Roberts and
Alito hearings. Justice Harlan’s confirmation hearing, for example, was a
product of its time. The major source of controversy was his position on the
advisory board of the Atlantic Union Committee, which favored a transatlantic
union not unlike the current European Union. Of the 183 questions Harlan was
asked, only three pertained to constitutional methodology.203 Less than a year
after the Court had effectively overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,204 all three method-
ological questions related to whether the Court should ever change established
constitutional interpretations in the absence of an amendment. The first time
Harlan was asked a question along those lines, he did not understand what he
was being asked.205 By contrast, Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Goldberg,
whose hearings coincided with Brown’s controversial implementation, were
201. See EISGRUBER, supra note 195, at 35 (“The idea that judges should defer to the intentions of the
people who drafted and ratified the Constitution is a real interpretive strategy, not a rhetorical trick like
‘strict construction.’”).
202. When a question was repeated because the nominee did not hear or understand what was asked,
I did not count two questions. I did count two questions, however, if a question was repeated because
the Senator was not satisfied with the response.
203. See Nomination of John Marshall Harlan, of New York, To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 140–41 (1955)
[hereinafter Harlan Nomination].
204. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
205. Senator Eastland asked Judge Harlan on behalf of another unnamed Senator, “Do you believe
the Supreme Court of the United States should change established interpretations of the Constitution to
accord with the economic, political, or sociological views of those who from time to time constitute the
membership of the Court?” Harlan answered, non-responsively, that the Court is bound by the
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questioned repeatedly on whether the Constitution may be amended judicially.
The hearings of Justices Stevens and O’Connor were relatively light on
methodological questions. The O’Connor hearing, the first to appear live before
the American public, saw a dramatic increase in the number of questions—338,
compared to 199 asked of Justice Stevens—but less than ten percent of those
questions related to methodology. By contrast, she was repeatedly questioned
about the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping, which was the conservative
strategy du jour. Indeed, Senator Dole spoke of the term “strict construction”
the way Adams and Strouse spoke of Herbert Hoover:206 “We used to talk about
strict constructionists around here—it has been some time. I do not quite
remember when that was, come to think of it, but what does that term mean to
you? It was one that was widely discussed.”207
By the time of Bork’s 1987 hearing, which coincided with the 200th anniver-
sary of the Constitution’s drafting, “strict constructionism” had been translated
into the modern idiom. Bork not only described himself as an originalist (as
O’Connor had done), but he was willing openly to attack what he believed to be
unprincipled decisionmaking in decisions as popular as Bolling v. Sharpe,208
Shelley v. Kraemer,209 and Griswold v. Connecticut.210 What today is viewed as
a template for how not to get confirmed to the Supreme Court was thought at
the time to test the extent to which the soundness of a constitutional methodol-
ogy could be divorced from the public saleability of the results it dictated.211 Of
the staggering 1,182 questions I tallied over Bork’s four days of testimony, 175
were about the constitutional methodology he chose to place immediately in
issue.212
Bork is the only nominee to receive more questions about constitutional
methodology than Roberts and Alito, who rank second and third respectively.
Judge Roberts was asked early and repeatedly about methodology generally and
about originalism specifically. Of the 916 questions asked of Roberts, 135
Constitution. When pressed he conceded that he had “misinterpreted the question.” Harlan Nomination,
supra note 203, at 140.
206. See LEE ADAMS & CHARLES STROUSE, Those Were the Days, on ALL IN THE FAMILY (Atlantic
Records 1971).
207. Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O’Connor of Arizona To Serve as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 94
(1981).
208. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
209. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
210. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
211. Senator Simpson was prescient in gauging the impact the Bork hearing would have on
subsequent nomination battles. Citing the milquetoast responses of O’Connor, Scalia, and Rehnquist in
response to questions about their substantive views, he said: “This will never happen again. Doesn’t
matter whether you are confirmed or rejected. . . . [T]hat next time and every time before we would
have the same answer to the same questions, . . . and they will be more accepted by us if they have
written nothing, done nothing and said nothing.” Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
851–52 (1987) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
212. See id. at 103–05 (opening statement of Judge Bork).
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related to constitutional methodology, including fifty-two of the 178 written
questions submitted. Four different Senators questioned Roberts about original-
ism.213 Notably, when Senator Schumer asked Judge Roberts at the end of the
hearing what questions he would ask himself were he a senator, Roberts replied,
“I would ask a lot of the questions that have been asked, a lot of the questions
that were asked in the questionnaire that I completed earlier, and it begins with
the most important question, What is your view of the proper role of a judge in
our system?”214
Over the course of fifty years, we went from three questions about methodol-
ogy—one of which the nominee did not understand and evidently had not
contemplated—to more than 100 such questions, not including the one the
nominee says he would have asked of himself. And with the advent of televised
hearings, we saw an additional dynamic of relevance to this discussion. Not
only did televised hearings correspond with a sharp increase in the number of
questions asked, but the Senators often specifically addressed the television
audience in the course of addressing the witness. At Judge Roberts’s hearing,
for example, Senator Sessions spent much of his time in his first question
describing the federal court system to the public.215 Senators Cornyn and Kyl
mentioned that many people in the audience were hearing about concepts they
had never heard before and described the process as a pedagogical moment.216
At the Alito hearing, Senator Hatch asked Judge Alito to explain the meaning of
“pro se,” and Senator Sessions patiently explained to the viewing audience the
distinction between a trial and an appellate court.217 Not only was there more
discussion of methodology generally—Alito received ninety-seven questions on
methodology—but there was a concomitant recognition that the Senators and
the witness were in dialogue with the public as much as with each other.
For this, the originalism movement deserves some credit. The confirmation
process represents our most significant site for political-legal translation, a
moment at which the public is more educated about the business of the federal
courts and at which that business is held to uncommon public scrutiny. And for
reasons I discuss in section III.B, methodology is the dialogic terrain on which
traditional originalists are most comfortable.218 Understanding judges as agents
213. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 158, 181, 203, 298 (2005)
[hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (Sen. Hatch, Sen. Grassley, Sen. Kohl, Sen. Specter, respectively).
214. Id. at 438–39.
215. Id. at 232–36.
216. Id. at 272, 332–34 (Sen. Cornyn and Sen. Kyl, respectively).
217. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
337–38, 403–04 (2006) (Sen. Hatch and Sen. Sessions, respectively).
218. In the press release announcing Men in Black, Levin stated: “We need to broaden the debate
during the nomination process to include more than simply the qualifications of individual candidates.
There must be a discussion about the role of the Court, and whether the public wants so many important
decisions made by a handful of unelected lawyers.” Conservative Leads Challenge, supra note 83.
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not of justice but of process shifts the terms of debate from a battle over
competing moral conceptions to one over competing justifications for judicial
authority. A generation of legal scholars had struggled to rationalize the Warren
Court’s aggressive approach to judicial review. Bringing elements of the public
into the conversation over professional norms complicated those scholars’ task
enormously. Meanwhile, originalists had their arguments about the integrity of
judicial review down pat, and to an impressive degree, they stayed on message.
Today, a substantial portion of the American public reports an affinity for
originalism. A 2005 Fox News poll asked the following question of registered
voters:
Which of the following comes closest to your view of how the Constitution
should be interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court? Judges should base their
rulings on what they believe the Constitution’s framers meant when it was
originally written. Judges should base their rulings on what they believe the
Constitution means in today’s world.
Forty-seven percent of respondents chose the “Framers’ intent” option, while
only thirty-six percent chose contemporary meaning.219 In a more polemically
worded July 2008 poll conducted by Quinnipiac University, forty percent of
respondents reported believing that “[i]n making decisions, the Supreme Court
should only consider the original intentions of the authors of the Constitu-
tion.”220 Fifty-two percent of respondents favored the proposed alternative, that
“[i]n making decisions, the Supreme Court should consider changing times and
current realities in applying the principles of the Constitution.”221 This number
is in line with identically worded Quinnipiac polls in 2007, 2005, and 2003.222
Belief in the exclusivity of original-intent originalism—a position held by no
prominent academic I am aware of—is not solely a conservative phenomenon:
roughly one-third of Democrats report holding this view.223 Significantly, only
219. FOX News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, Aug. 30–31, 2005, http://www.pollingreport.com/
court2.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). Ten percent of respondents said that judges should use a
combination of the two, and eight percent were unsure.
220. Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, supra note 12.
221. Id. Fifty-two percent supported the alternative formulation and eight percent had no opinion or
were unresponsive.
222. Id. The percentages were the following: 48% (2007), 50% (July 2005), 51% (May 2005), and
54% (2003).
223. See id.; see also Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, Voters Back Supreme
Court Limit on School Deseg 3-1 Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Approval of Congress
Drops to Lowest Point Ever (Aug. 16, 2007) (placing Democratic support for the originalist position at
thirty percent); Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, Supreme Court Nominee Should
Speak up on Abortion, U.S. Voters Tell Quinnipiac University National Poll; Bush Approval Drops to
New Low (July 27, 2005) (placing Democratic support for the originalist position at thirty-four
percent); Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, U.S. Voters Back Roe v. Wade 2-1,
Support Filibusters, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Bush Approval at Lowest Point Ever
(May 25, 2005) (placing Democratic support for the originalist position at thirty-one percent); Press
Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, Supreme Court Should Listen to the People, Ameri-
2009] 695SELLING ORIGINALISM
eight percent of respondents to the 2008 poll said they did not know enough to
answer whether they favored a jurisprudence of original intent. By contrast,
some forty-five percent of respondents to a May 2005 Quinnipiac poll could not
say whether or not they had a favorable opinion of William Rehnquist, even
though the question identified Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.224 The public does not seem to understand the Court or its business with
nearly the sophistication of legal professionals and academics, but it is nonethe-
less willing to offer an opinion on constitutional methodology.
* * *
I have endeavored in this Part to describe the recent success of originalist
argument in sociopolitical terms—terms which are not its own. Appeals to
original intent have the power, certainly in a thin sense and arguably in more
fundamental ways, to translate political ends into constitutional law. Moreover,
an important segment of the public—beyond law professors—accepts original-
ist arguments as legitimate. As Post and Siegel write, a certain brand of
originalism has “flourished” over the last two decades.225 In that time it has
“emerged as a new and powerful kind of constitutional politics in which claims
about the sole legitimate method of interpreting the Constitution [have] inspired
conservative mobilization in both electoral politics and in the legal profes-
sion.”226 Barnett goes further still: “Originalism has not only survived the
debate of the eighties, but it has virtually triumphed over its rivals.”227
III. ORIGINALISM AS NON-ORIGINALIST
The success of originalism results not from its penetrable logic but from its
consistency with a political morality defended most ardently by originalism’s
opponents. Non-originalist constitutional interpretive methodologies frequently
locate the sustained popular acquiescence necessary and sufficient to update the
Constitution within the successful efforts of social movements—through pro-
cesses of political capture and reinforcement—to alter our collective understand-
ing of the content of our national commitments. Proponents of such
methodologies rarely consider the implications of recognizing such transforma-
tive power within the originalism movement itself. Section III.A argues that
such consideration is necessary. Section III.B then sketches a market-based
model for situating the Judiciary and the larger public within what I call the
cans Tell Quinnipiac University Poll; 2-1 Are Opposed to Race-Based College Admissions (Mar. 5,
2003) (placing Democratic support for the originalist position at thirty-two percent).
224. Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute (May 25, 2005), supra note 223.
225. Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 548.
226. Id.
227. Barnett, supra note 74, at 613; cf. James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory?: Originalism, Active
Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1623 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)); cf. also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN
ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)) (“For the last fifteen years
or so, Justice Antonin Scalia and his sympathizers within and outside the academy have dominated
discussion and debate over how best to interpret the Constitution.”).
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supply chain for constitutional methodologies. Section III.C defends the use of a
market metaphor in the context of a discourse over legal professional norms.
Then, in section III.D, I suggest three features of originalism—its appeals to
simplicity, populism, and nativism—that enable it to compete successfully
within that market. Finally, section III.E explains why methodologies, and not
decisional outcomes, are my objects of concern.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE AS CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Chief Justice Roberts began his confirmation hearing by likening the job of a
Supreme Court Justice to that of a baseball umpire: “Judges are like umpires.
Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited
role.”228 The analogy has much to commend it, though not for the reasons the
Chief Justice suggests.229 An umpire calls balls and strikes according to the
strike zone. The rules of baseball do not describe the strike zone as a matter of
discretion. Rather the strike zone submits to a specific anatomical definition that
is written into those rules.230 Yet, any baseball fan will tell you that the strike
zone is far narrower than what is described in the text of the rule and that, quite
apart from several formal amendments of that rule, it has narrowed over
time.231 Any umpire who based his strike zone on original intent would have to
throw out a lot of managers. In Philip Bobbitt’s terminology, original intent is
not a conventional “modality” for determining the strike zone.232
But it might be. Imagine a team has a stable of pitchers who specialize in
getting batters to swing and miss at high pitches. A charismatic fan of such a
team begins a public campaign to convince other fans that umpires who do not
call high strikes are not being faithful to the text of or original intent behind the
rules of baseball. In certain ballparks, umpires who fail to call strikes according
to original intent are roundly jeered. Newspaper columnists and sports bloggers
call for such umpires to lose their jobs. Over time, some umpires begin to call a
wider strike zone and, over still more time, consideration of original intent
becomes a conventional means of calling balls and strikes. What began as a
228. Roberts Hearing, supra note 213, at 55.
229. While the Chief Justice’s analogy implies that neither judges nor umpires have discretion, in
fact the inverse is true. Cf. Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 701 (2007) (arguing that the analogy misstates the judicial role).
230. The strike zone is defined as “that area over home plate the upper limit of which is a horizontal
line at the midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower
level is a line at the hollow beneath the knee cap. The Strike Zone shall be determined from the batter’s
stance as the batter is prepared to swing at a pitched ball.” Major League Baseball, Official Rules: 2.00
Definition of Terms, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/official_rules/definition_
terms_2.jsp.
231. See GLEN WAGGONER, SPLITTERS, BEANBALLS, AND THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING STRIKE ZONE: THE
STORIES BEHIND THE RULES OF BASEBALL 41–45 (2000). For a useful chronology of the history of the
strike zone, see Baseball Almanac, The Strike Zone: A Chronological Examination of the Official Rules,
http://www.baseball-almanac.com/articles/strike_zone_rules_history.shtml.
232. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991).
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narrow political campaign will have blossomed into a phenomenon of baseball
practice and a source of baseball truth.
In constitutional adjudication, we are not just fans but also players. The
determinations of constitutional meaning the Supreme Court makes in close
cases determine our own rights and obligations as well as those of others. As
Bobbitt has described, there is a matrix of legal arguments that our culture
recognizes as able to legitimate constitutional decisions.233 Bobbitt identifies
historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and what he terms “ethical”
arguments as constituting that matrix.234 Part of Bobbitt’s project is to demon-
strate that in our constitutional system there is no external criterion for legiti-
macy. Legitimate constitutional decisions are those that obey the conventional
grammar of constitutional argument, full stop.235 There is obvious sense in the
reliance of pluralistic theories of constitutional interpretation such as Bobbitt’s
on what Richard Fallon labels “the implicit norms of our constitutional prac-
tice.”236
But nonpluralists also generally tailor their arguments to those norms. Ronald
Dworkin’s nonpluralistic commitment to “law as integrity” requires that consti-
tutional interpretation fit contemporary constitutional and political practices.237
Those practices might accord a prominent place to an array of arguments,
including those that proceed from text, history, and precedent.238 Bruce Acker-
man’s dualist-democracy thesis is also nonpluralistic but follows from his
conclusion that American constitutional practice is dualist. Ackerman states,
“Unless and until a political movement does succeed in entrenching a modern
Bill of Rights, dualism describes the ambition of the American enterprise better
than any foundationalist interpretation.”239 There is general agreement across a
wide spectrum of scholars that constitutional theories should, in some measure,
“fit or explain the central features of our constitutional order.”240
That agreement proceeds naturally from a concern for relevance, a desire to
avoid becoming academic in its more pejorative sense. But it also follows from
the view of many constitutional theorists, pluralist and nonpluralist alike, that
the reason the Constitution legitimately binds us is because we accept it as
authoritative.241 I alluded to this view in my earlier discussion of the various
233. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–8 (1982).
234. Id. at 3–119. Ethical arguments are those derived from a set of traditions and institutional
arrangements that are peculiar to the American ethos. Id. at 94.
235. See id. at 5.
236. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–93 (1987).
237. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 378, 380 (1986).
238. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
8–12 (1996).
239. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 16 (1991).
240. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How To Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 545
(1999).
241. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 28, at 225 (“Given the questionable authority of the American
Constitution . . . it is only through a history of continuing assent or acquiescence that the document
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critiques of a strong originalist position.242 Consent, either implicit or explicit,
forms the irreducible core of democratic self-government. Originalists generally
derive the consent relevant to the legitimacy of judicial review from the popular
ratification of the Constitution and its amendments. But as I have discussed,
many non-originalists locate popular consent elsewhere, for example in the
well-settled precedents of the Supreme Court. McConnell writes:
[M]any decisions, even some that were questionable or controversial when
rendered, have become part of the fabric of American life; it is inconceivable
that they would now be overruled. . . . The staying power of these holdings is
not attributable to the bare fact that the Supreme Court decided them, for
other decisions of equally long standing remain controversial and subject to
reconsideration. The difference, I think, lies in the fact of overwhelming
public acceptance. Whatever may have been their original legal merit, these
decisions have been accepted by the nation. Legislatures do not pass laws in
defiance of these decisions; commentators do not attack their reasoning
(except as an academic exercise, which serves a different purpose than
provoking their reconsideration); people have forgotten they ever were contro-
versial. This overwhelming public acceptance constitutes a mode of popular
ratification, which gives these decisions legitimacy and authority . . . .243
There comes a time in the precedential life of certain constitutional decisions at
which their reconsideration is no longer a matter of ordinary judicial politics.
Judicial nominees are not today asked whether they believe Brown should be
overruled. It is common ground among all participants in our constitutional
system that overruling Brown in short order would require an Article V amend-
ment. Deliberate segregation of public facilities by race is the called strike that
even the batter concedes.
Plainly, the same is not true of Roe v. Wade. Senator Specter’s attempt to
goad then-Judge Roberts to acquiesce in his description of the case as not
merely a precedent of the Court but a “super-duper precedent” was an effort, in
part, to tease out Roberts’s own measure of popular ratification.244 But Roe has
could become law.”); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Descriptive and Normative Constitutional Theory:
The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1772 (1997) (“The authority of the Constitution
today rests on its general acceptance as authoritative rather than on its adoption in 1787.”); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790–92 (2005) (“[T]he legal
legitimacy of the Constitution depends much more on its present sociological acceptance (and thus its
sociological legitimacy) than upon the (questionable) legality of its formal ratification.”); Simon, supra
note 45, at 611 (“The United States Constitution is authoritative because major American institutional
actors such as legislative bodies, courts, and agencies as well as a large segment of the population . . .
regard the Constitution as a source of legally controlling rules and norms.”).
242. See supra section I.C.
243. McConnell, supra note 35, at 2417.
244. Roberts Hearing, supra note 213, at 145; see Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1751 (2007).
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not been “ratified,”245 at least not in the sense in which Brown has. The question
of whether the Constitution guarantees a woman’s right to an abortion remains a
subject of hot political debate, the temperature of which was raised by Roe
itself.246 The way to overrule Roe in short order is not via a constitutional
amendment but by changing the Court’s composition.
Recognizing that our constitutional practice distinguishes between ordinary
precedents and those that attain the status of constitutional content is Acker-
man’s chief contribution. Specter’s silly phrase demonstrated, however, that we
lack a shared vocabulary for differentiating between what I call “thick” and
“thin” constitutional law.247 Whether Brown-like or Roe-like, the Supreme
Court’s constitutional decisions count as law in the United States,248 but they do
not all count in the same way. Returning to our baseball analogy, the umpire’s
call forms part of the law of baseball, but individual participants and fans might
disagree with his conception of a strike. Sufficient arguing with and criticism of
the umpire has the demonstrated capacity to make him and his colleagues
change the rule itself. We might identify a strike zone suffering through
withering criticism as “thinner” law than a strike zone that proceeds unchal-
lenged.249 Much non-originalist scholarship seeks an account of this distinction
within constitutional law. While other scholars may disagree as to how Acker-
man identifies higher politics, accounting for the possibility of constitutional
change through the political thickening or thinning of law outside of Article V is
a common feature of non-originalist theories. We can say, then, that another
reason why many non-originalists care deeply about actual constitutional prac-
tice is because such practice may, under certain conditions peculiar to a given
theory, become constitutional law on par with the text.
This logic applies as much to constitutional decisions as to the methodologies
that are said to generate them. As Bobbitt notes, the various modalities are
stable over short periods of time—a generation, say—but they are not inevitable
features of constitutional practice: “[i]t would not surprise me if some of the
present forms should fall into desuetude. . . . Because the constitutional system
of establishing these forms is entirely descriptive of practice, any change that is
245. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1149–50 (2008).
246. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review To
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1079–80 (2004) (arguing that Roe raised
the stakes of politics by preempting an adequate political movement).
247. I use these terms differently than Tushnet, who differentiates between the “thin” Constitution—
the fundamental guarantees of liberty and equality that it shares with the Declaration of Independence—
and the “thick” Constitution—the document’s structural provisions. See MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 7–11 (1999). In my very different lexicon, “thin” constitutional
law represents those guarantees that remain contested and political, whereas “thick” constitutional law
refers to consensus understandings that are no longer in a position to be revised by judges.
248. See Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 659.
249. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 90–91 (1970)
(favorably comparing Brown to the Court’s school prayer decisions along analogous dimensions).
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sufficiently widespread becomes a legitimate participant.”250 In other words,
modalities may grow in stature or shrink even to extinction. Proponents of
originalism promote its growth at the expense of other arguments, particularly
of the prudential, ethical, and doctrinal varieties. To the extent that the original-
ist project succeeds in promoting originalism’s priority over other modalities,
pluralists must revise their accounts of decisional legitimacy and nonpluralists
must recognize that the susceptibility of a constitutional decision to originalist
appeals may affect its stability as constitutional law and its place along the
spectrum of constitutional thickness. What’s more, the capacities of institutional
players, interest groups, and ordinary citizens to endow a methodology with the
ability to translate political ends into acceptable constitutional forms, and their
methods of doing so, should be as significant to non-originalist constitutional
theorists as the capacities of political actors to affect the course of substantive
constitutional decisionmaking.
In short, many non-originalist theoretical models need not only to acknowl-
edge but also to accommodate the success of originalism as a political prac-
tice.251 To the extent that originalism succeeds at generating thick constitutional
law, it succeeds on non-originalist terms notwithstanding its failure on its own
terms. This has the feel of a paradox, but it isn’t. The theoretical failing of
originalism is that it lacks an account of how legitimate constitutional change
occurs outside the Constitution’s text or original understanding. It lacks an
account of how judicial pronouncements (among other legal and political acts)
come to be constitutional law. But non-originalist theories that do include such
an account must create within it a space for the originalism movement, or else
explain why no space is needed.
The legal community does not and cannot monopolize the discourse around
constitutional legitimacy.252 The public participates in that discourse and makes
claims, at times vulgarly, within it. Insofar as the rhetoric of constitutional
methodology is itself a subject of conventional political discourse, a model of
the political appeal of methodologies must be internal to any model of constitu-
tional change outside the text and history of the Constitution.253 On the logic of
250. Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1916–17, 1919 (1994).
251. I borrow this phrase from Post and Siegel, who have come closest to developing the themes of
interest to this Article. See Post & Siegel, supra note 14; see also What Is Living Constitutionalism?,
Part II, Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/03/what-is-living-
constitutionalism-part.html (Mar. 28, 2008, 6:00 EST) (“The conservative originalism of the past
several decades has been an attempt to replace a more liberal constitutionalism with a more conserva-
tive one. . . . That is also an example of the processes of a living constitution, although not one many
liberals like.”).
252. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 925 (1986) (“Most
theories of constitutional law rest on some notion of the consent of the governed, either through tacit
institutional acquiescence or through some kind of social contract theory. A brilliant theory is by
definition one that would not occur to most people. It is hard to see how the vast majority of the
population can be presumed to have agreed to something that they could not conceive of.”)
253. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN
JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 11–12 (2004) (“If the development of modern constitutional law has reflected
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such models, it might be that originalism is not persuasive because it is right,
but rather becomes right because it is sufficiently persuasive.254
B. THE MARKET FOR METHODOLOGIES
What might a model of the political appeal of constitutional methodologies
look like? In developing such a model it is useful first to recognize that the
various methodologies are in active competition with each other. Many political
conservatives want the Court to be originalist; many liberals want the Court to
recognize evolving conceptions of substantive due process and cruel and un-
usual punishment; many libertarians want the Court to recognize certain natural
rights or embrace the philosophies of John Stuart Mill or Milton Friedman.
Whether or not the Court’s commitment to each methodology would in the end
lead to the preferred political outcomes of its proponents, each group is, through
the mechanisms of political competition, attempting to influence both the Court
and the public generally to buy the modality it is selling. Those mechanisms
include, at varying nodes along the supply chain for constitutional ideas:
academic articles, amicus briefs, white papers, the interest group politics that
surround the judicial nomination process, legal and political blogs, newspaper
editorials, broadcast and cable news, and talk radio.
Constitutional methodologies are distributed by constitutional judges to the
people generally. The people are not, of course, a single indivisible entity. We
are an amalgam of individuals, differently situated along the supply chain and at
various levels of constitutional engagement. Not only are different people
differently engaged constitutively, as for example constitutional lawyers are
typically more engaged than teenagers, but as Ackerman has noted, any one
person’s engagement with higher politics varies over time.255 Frederick Schauer
recently observed and sought to demonstrate empirically that “neither constitu-
tional decisionmaking nor Supreme Court adjudication occupies a substantial
portion of the nation’s policy agenda or the public’s interest.”256 That is beyond
reasonable dispute. The set of issues that most people care about most of the
time is radically different than, and indeed barely conversant with, those that the
Court’s typical docket comprises. That does not mean the public does not care
about the Court as an institution. It does mean, though, that the conclusions it
reaches about the Court’s activities are likely to be influenced disproportion-
ately by periods of unusual constitutional engagement, such as the Bork hear-
the efforts of conservative justices (and others) to fashion and maintain a coherent constitutional vision
out of their competing political and legal commitments, then we must pay careful attention to the
evolution of competing doctrinal arguments and broader constitutional rhetorics over the past genera-
tion.”).
254. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) (“We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
255. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 58; ACKERMAN, supra note 239.
256. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—and the
Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (2006).
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ings or the 2000 presidential election.
Judges are not the only producers of methodologies nor are they only
producers. Whether one is a producer or a consumer of a methodology depends
not on one’s professional status but on one’s intentions. Academics, politicians,
lawyers, and indeed anyone with an interest to be served by a methodology may
also therefore be a supplier, and judges often, perhaps typically, act as intermedi-
aries between academics and the public, “buying” constitutional ideas that they
then repackage and “sell” to consumers. Among all the various suppliers of
constitutional ideas, however, judges are unique because they are lawgivers.
They are accountable for a methodology’s general merchantability—its consis-
tency with the conventional forms of constitutional argument—and for its
fitness for the particular cases in which it is employed. A judge who consistently
produces defective methodologies will lose prestige and will be unable to corral
and preserve the majorities necessary to distribute her constitutional ideas.257
Politicians and the media—newspapers, magazines, bloggers, radio and televi-
sion personalities—may act as intermediaries as well, though they are typically
closer to what we might call the retail end of the supply chain of constitutional
methodologies. It has been said that the dynamics of intermediation are chang-
ing within political markets, as in commercial markets. As Yochai Benkler
observes, “The possibility of sustainable, widely accessible and effective commu-
nications by individuals or groups, organized on- or offline, makes possible
direct democratic discourse. It creates direct means for the acquisition of
information and opinion.”258 A similar process may be occurring in the market
for methodologies. Where once a small core of well-connected legal academics
engaged in closed-circuit conversation about constitutional methodology with a
relatively small number of federal judges, and those judges produced opinions
that reached the public via a limited number of newspaper reporters,259 the
audience for the fruits of academic and judicial discourse is now vast and
expanding.260
Levin’s Men in Black,261 for example, was virtually ignored by traditional
Supreme Court media and the legal academy. It was not reviewed in the New
York Times or the Washington Post, and in the week it reached its peak on the
best-seller list, David Garrow was quoted as saying, “The fascinating thing is
that it’s a bestseller on a subject where 100 percent of us who present ourselves
257. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 117–18 (including “popularity” and “prestige” in the judicial
utility function).
258. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52
DUKE L.J. 1245, 1263 (2003).
259. The Court was once called “the worst reported . . . institution in the American system of
government.” LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS PUBLICS: THE COMMUNICATION OF
POLICY DECISIONS 58 (1978) (quoting Max Freedman, in Mark Cannon, An Administrator’s View of the
Supreme Court, 22 FED. BAR NEWS 112 (1975)). Plainly, that is no longer so.
260. See supra section II.C.
261. LEVIN, supra note 78.
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as experts haven’t read it.”262 Tushnet said at the time that he “has not read
‘Men in Black’ and does not know anyone who has.”263 Levin explained that
the book is “written in plain English and not for Harvard Yard”;264 it was
marketed on talk radio and over the Internet. Levin was able to reach an entire
deliberative community without going through the conventional intermediar-
ies.265 One could surmise that the rise of legal blogs, the increasingly pedagogi-
cal tone of Supreme Court confirmation hearings, the recent increase in the
number of public appearances and interviews by Supreme Court Justices,266 and
even perhaps the decline in traditional doctrinal scholarship267 all may be
explained in part by this protestantization of constitutional methodological
discourse.268
C. TESTING THE MARKET (METAPHOR)
Market analogies are famously fraught. They might suffer from one of two
common maladies. First, they might be descriptively inaccurate. I leave it to the
reader and to future scholarship to determine whether the market metaphor I
have suggested accurately describes the process by which constitutional interpre-
tive methodologies are communicated and gain adherents.269 The second com-
mon problem with market analogies is that, even if accurate, they might be
262. Charles Lane, Conservative’s Book on Supreme Court Is a Bestseller, WASH. POST, Mar. 20,
2005, at A6.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See Dahlia Lithwick, The Limbaugh Code: The New York Times Best Seller No One Is Talking
About, SLATE, Apr. 1, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2116087 (“To refuse to acknowledge the call-to-
arms behind Men in Black, as the press and most of the legal academy has done, can feel like
intellectual integrity. But it also represents a failure to take part in a national conversation that may have
very serious long-term consequences for the courts.”); cf. Jack M. Balkin, Online Legal Scholarship:
The Medium and the Message, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 23, 28 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/
2006/09/06/balkin.html (“Online media don’t just route around traditional gatekeepers. They also glom
onto them—they depend on them rather than displace them. . . . The old gatekeepers don’t go away
entirely, and new ones arise that partially supplement and partially compete with them.”).
266. See Mark Sherman, High Court Becomes More Media Friendly, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/25/AR2006122500298_pf.html.
267. Cf. Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8.
268. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27–29 (1988). Levinson uses the metaphor of
Catholics and Protestants to discuss competing visions of constitutional interpretive authority. I think
the metaphor is apt as well to describe a shift from a narrow font of relatively obtuse methodological
wisdom to widespread retail-level engagement with constitutional arguments.
269. The metaphor does have more to commend it in this context than in the First Amendment area.
Some critics have suggested that the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor misunderstands the subjective
nature of truth and is incapable of representing how ideas are disseminated in the real world. See, e.g.,
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1; David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 348–49 (1991). There are
important differences between the market for interpretive methodologies and the market for “ideas”
generally. Most significantly, the existence and staying power of judicial opinions provides an ascertain-
able measure of market activity and success. The market I have described is supposed to produce law,
not truth.
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normatively inappropriate. Most of us believe that some things that might be
commodified—sex, kidneys, babies, and so on—should not be. Many of us also
believe that some things that have been completely or partially commodified—
secondary education, health care, or housing, say—should not have been.270
Simply to describe an existing or putative market in such things without
discussing whether and to what extent the market should determine how those
things are distributed may be a mistake in emphasis. Developing and relying
upon market metaphors may therefore have the effect of generating policy
proposals that respond to a normatively incorrect hierarchy of values.271 The
question remains whether conceiving of constitutional methodology in the
language of commodification is appropriate and whether the operation of a
market in methodologies is beneficial to constitutional law. Is pandering to the
interpretive “preferences” of the public, expressed in necessarily imperfect
ways, any way to adjudicate a constitutional dispute?
A complete answer to that question is beyond the scope of this Article, but it
is useful briefly to discuss some of the relevant considerations. Our discomfort
with describing certain transactions in market terms arises out of a common
concern that the rhetoric of commercial exchange impoverishes our understand-
ing of what is valuable about certain putative commodities. But most of us also
believe it entirely appropriate, indeed enriching, to use market language to
discuss the exchange of traditional commodities. We might conceive of a
spectrum ranging from those items, T-shirts, say, for which commodification
identifies the normatively appropriate values better than noncommodification, to
those, like love, for which the converse is true.
It is not obvious where constitutional interpretive methodology falls along
that spectrum. It is certainly arguable that a conscientious constitutional judge
should at least in some sense be giving the people what they want. The
existence and authority of popular constitutional values legitimate judicial
review for originalists and non-originalists alike. And it is certainly true that, in
theory at least, popular values may attach in the relevant way to methodology as
such. One could imagine a constitutional amendment that provided general
instructions on how constitutional provisions should be interpreted by judges.
Many states and foreign countries have similar codifications with respect to
statutory interpretation,272 and the Constitution provides specific rules of construc-
tion in the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments. Such a hypothetical constitutional
270. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1856–57 (1987).
271. See id. at 1878; see also Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT.
REV. 1 (arguing that the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor has led to an overemphasis on the “truth
seeking” and “self-government” values of free speech); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2363–66 (2000) (suggesting that the apparent
implications of the theory of the marketplace of ideas do not jibe with First Amendment doctrine, which
is not content-neutral in fact).
272. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085, 2089–90 (2002).
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interpretation amendment could, for example, require that textual ambiguities
be resolved in favor of original expected application. Under many non-
originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation, there is no theoretical
reason why a similar outcome could not be achieved outside of the Article V
process. That result would require that originalist methodology achieve conspicu-
ous dominance within legal practice or become a driving force behind the
thickening of constitutional law.
In thinking about whether a market metaphor appropriately describes the
process by which methodologies are popularized, it is crucial to develop a
normative account of judges’ roles in motivating the values that the metaphor
contemplates them responding to. If judges should have no affirmative role in
that process and should simply craft or adopt methodologies that respond to an
exogenous set of preferences, then a market metaphor seems appropriate. We
would then want to ask whether we can identify a market failure: whether and
to what extent there is slippage between our actual methodological preferences
and the perceived preferences to which judges are systematically responsive. If
we believe instead that judges should play a role in persuading people that they
should or should not demand certain qualities in constitutional decisionmaking,
then a market metaphor will be less effective at generating satisfactory prescrip-
tions. If it is valuable to conceive of law in terms of its commitment to reason,
then it disserves us to promulgate models that conceive of it solely in terms of
its capacity to be enjoyed or beneficially experienced. The fact that the public is
responsive to a particular rhetoric may not be sufficient reason for judges to
tailor their interpretive methodology to that rhetoric, particularly to the exclu-
sion of other conceptions of the judicial role.
I defend neither position here, but I do want to suggest that the first, more
passive conception of the judge’s role is not obviously the less attractive. The
notion that judges should deploy methodologies that have achieved public
acceptance need not entail the wholesale outsourcing of professional reason.
Legal professionals are an important segment of the public and exercise influ-
ence over public attitudes that are out of proportion to their representation in the
population.273 That is certainly true today when, as mentioned, a significant
segment of the public pays no attention whatever to constitutional adjudication.
Professional reason is best understood as an important component of public
appeal, not as its opposite. Professionals can and do use their elite status to
influence public opinion in the direction of genuine views derived from reason.
Judges are of course part of that professional elite and even on the “passive”
view of the judicial role may influence public opinion in their roles as citizens.
Doing so would not prevent them from acting as receivers of public wisdom
when they are actually adjudicating cases. The point is not that public appeal
273. See generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 39–67 (1998) (arguing that persuasion under complex
conditions requires that a listener perceive a speaker to be both knowledgeable and trustworthy).
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should displace professional reason but that professional reason should not be
dispositive.274
The question of the appropriate role of judges may also be informed by their
relative competence to identify and enforce our higher law preferences. The
likelihood of market failure may well lead us to prefer a system in which judges
do not conceive of themselves as satisfying rhetorical demands but instead think
of themselves as norm entrepreneurs.275 Ascertaining market failure is not,
however, an easy task. The market for methodologies, such as it is, is not
perfectly competitive. There are obvious barriers to entry in becoming a judge
and well-known difficulties in punishing judges who are not responsive to the
public—life tenure, the unavailability of salary reduction, and an entrenched
culture of judicial independence. Perhaps the prospect of prestige and the desire
to build and maintain court majorities create incentives for judges to respond to
popularly informed values.276 But it is not at all clear whether those values in
fact represent our higher law values and, in any event, they do not perfectly
determine judicial decisionmaking.
To complicate matters further, the public might be genuinely indifferent to
some slippage between methodological rhetoric and actual practice. In organiza-
tion theory, Chester Barnard wrote of a “zone of indifference” that makes
possible the cooperation of disparate individuals within an organization. Bar-
nard argued that the authority of orders proceeds from the bottom up—it
requires “the accepting of a communication as authoritative.”277 Someone who
accepts membership in an organization concomitantly is willing to obey an
essentially undifferentiated and unquestioned range of orders falling within his
zone of indifference.278 These observations may be generalizable to the author-
ity of judicial decisions. We are participants in a collective enterprise of
governance so complex that, in order both to enforce cooperation and to
guarantee competence, we give judges our proxy over matters of constitutional
interpretation.279 Professional reason may expose certain decisions as inconsis-
tent with methodological rhetoric, as for example in the apparent refusal of
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas to practice originalism in affirmative action
274. Cf. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 929–31 (1983) (discussing his
ambivalence over the gap between the rightness of the result and the weakness of Justice Powell’s
reasoning in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 435 U.S. 265 (1978)).
275. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996)
(defining norm entrepreneurs as “people interested in changing social norms”).
276. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
277. CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 163 (1938).
278. Id. at 169. Herbert Simon referred to this range instead as the “zone of acceptance,” or the
range of decisions for which a subordinate “permits his behavior to be guided by the decision of a
superior, without independently examining the merits of that decision.” HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 11, 12 (2d
ed. 1957).
279. See Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the Courts, 117 YALE L.J. 886, 916–17 (2008)
(reviewing KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2007)).
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cases.280 But the originalism “brand” may be less a promise of interpretive
fidelity than a mechanism for settling the question of authority. That is, credibly
advertising herself as an originalist may be sufficient to satisfy a public demand
that a judge is competent to issue authoritative orders. On this theory, what is
being sold is not a methodology inasmuch as it does not (without more) decide
cases. Rather it is a professional credential, the market for which does not “fail”
so long as decisions are falling within the public’s methodological zone of
indifference.281 Ensuring that decisions fall within that zone is plausibly within
the institutional competence of judges.
Market metaphors are most dangerous when they obscure values that moral-
ity or justice require us to recognize. They are most useful when they draw our
attention to values that our intuitions may not appreciate. The tendency among
constitutional theorists is to minimize the role public appeal should play in
generating and deploying constitutional methodologies.282 This, I think, insuffi-
ciently accounts for the source of judicial authority, particularly if public appeal
is understood to include continued engagement with the professional elite.
D. SELLING ORIGINALISM
Originalism is particularly well-situated to take advantage of what I have
suggested is the changing status of intermediaries in the market for constitu-
tional methodologies. Most importantly, to the extent that intermediaries close
to the wholesale side of the supply chain are marginalized, the failure of
originalism to satisfy its academic skeptics becomes less relevant. Retail consum-
ers of constitutional ideas are naturally less interested in what Daniel Farber
might call “brilliant” academic criticism.283 Originalism’s success is thereby
disaggregated from its theoretical bona fides and a premium is placed on those
features that appeal, even if superficially, to popular understandings of the
judicial role.
There are at least three features of originalism that place it at a competitive
advantage in the methodologies market. First, it is easier to understand than
other theories. Second, it caters to populist suspicion of legal elites. Third, it
appeals to a sense of cultural nationalism. I outline each in turn.
1. Simplicity
In a speech before the D.C. Federalist Society in November 1985, Meese
280. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427 (1997); Stephen A. Siegel, The
Federal Government’s Power To Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 477 (1998); see also Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
281. Cf. Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606
(2003) (“[T]he wealth of existing evidence suggests that most of the time judicial decisions fall within
the range of acceptability that one might expect of the agents of popular government.”).
282. See generally id. (exploring and criticizing that tendency).
283. See generally Farber, supra note 252.
708 [Vol. 97:657THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
explained that “[i]n the main, jurisprudence that seeks to be faithful to our
Constitution—a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, as I have called it—is not
difficult to describe.”284 From that aspect of originalism’s character—its elegant
simplicity—derives one of its greatest theoretical weaknesses. But originalism’s
simplicity is also one of its chief selling points and, therefore, one of its greatest
strengths. The Constitution is a written document. Written documents are
interpreted according to the intent of the parties to the document. Writes
Limbaugh of originalism, “It sounds like common sense, and it is . . . .”285
When interpretation can be explained in simple and unadulterated terms, it need
not be mediated through elites. As Justice Thomas has said, “[w]henever
possible, the Court and judges generally should adopt clear, bright-line rules
that, as I like to say to my clerks, you can explain to the gas station attendant as
easily as you can explain to a law professor.”286
Not only is originalism in fact relatively easy to explain to people outside the
legal academy, but its most vocal expositor actually does so. Witness Heller
itself, in which Justice Scalia wrote of the dissent, “Justice Stevens’ view thus
relies on the proposition, unsupported by any evidence, that different people of
the founding period had vastly different conceptions of the right to keep and
bear arms. That simply does not comport with our longstanding view that the
Bill of Rights codified venerable, widely understood liberties.”287 It is ironic
that Justice Scalia stated so controversial a proposition without a citation to any
evidence of his own,288 but it is easy to understand why. Originalism’s public
appeal relies heavily on perpetuating the presupposition that different people do
not routinely have vastly different conceptions of rights that they have nonethe-
less chosen to codify constitutionally.
The “simplicity” feature of originalism may therefore be its most useful.
Constitutional law, and individual rights cases in particular, require judges to
give definitive answers to questions that we have not always resolved defini-
tively as a people. Living constitutionalists tend to emphasize rather than
conceal that fact and seek to develop complicated heuristics aimed at discerning
correct answers. Conceiving of law in those terms is not, however, conducive to
cooperation. Better perhaps to agree on a common language—here, originalism—
284. Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen. of the United States, Speech Before the D.C. Chapter of the
Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in GREAT DEBATE, supra note 138, at 31, 36.
285. Rush Limbaugh, What Is Originalism?, in THE LIMBAUGH LETTER (Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/menu/limfunoriginalism.guest.html. Meese concurs: “Those who
framed the Constitution chose their words carefully; they debated at great length the most minute
points. The language they chose meant something. It is incumbent upon the Court to determine what
that meaning was. This is not a shockingly new theory; nor is it arcane or archaic.” Meese, supra note
14, at 465.
286. Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996).
287. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2804 (2008).
288. To take just one obvious counterexample, President Adams did not believe the Alien and
Sedition Acts violated the First Amendment. See Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Dec. 25,
1811), in CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN ADAMS AND THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1812–1826, at 26, 27 (photo. reprint
1972) (Paul Wilstach ed., 1925).
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and to let professional “linguists” argue amongst themselves as to specific
applications.289 Dan Kahan has suggested that deterrence arguments serve a
similar function in criminal law: “the deterrence idiom takes the political charge
out of contentious issues and deflects expressive contention away from the
criminal law.”290 So too the language of originalism, and particularly its appeal
to scientific norms, satisfies a public demand for a digestible means of muting
conflict over unresolved issues of constitutional law.291
Justice Scalia is keen to the need to appeal to the public directly. Court
watchers have noted that he “eschew[s] the reclusive public life of many
justices, or at least the blandly apolitical public lives of most, to play the role of
benighted public intellectual and knight gallant in the culture wars.”292 Scalia’s
public appearances are frequent and newsworthy. He at least appears to make
“every effort to insure his politically volatile statements are media-friendly. His
writing is eminently quotable. He laces his public statements and opinions with
doses of mockery, humor, and insult. He effectively deploys expressions of
alarm. He supplies a rare mix of legal analysis, emotional pique, and ideological
fervor.”293 Justice Scalia has the tongue of a pitchman, and he doesn’t hide what
he’s selling. The lead paragraph of the lead essay of his 1997 book, A Matter of
Interpretation, reductively describes construction of legal texts as a “science”
and says the essay “is addressed not just to lawyers but to all thoughtful
Americans who share our national obsession with the law.”294 The text of the
forty-seven-page essay is in fact pitched at that level.295 Justice Scalia is at ease
explaining his constitutional views to laypersons. That has much to do with his
affable personality but, I would argue, as much to do with the fact that the
methodology he is selling can be painlessly reduced to a sound bite.296
The elegance of originalism recommends it not only to the lay public but also
289. Cf. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ BELIEFS
ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 85–86 (2002) (concluding on the basis of empirical research
that “people do not want to make political decisions themselves, . . . [and] would . . . prefer decisions to
be made by . . . empathetic, non-self-interested decision makers”).
290. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 417 (1999).
291. Cf. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901) (“The tendency of a common and easy
resort to [judicial review is] to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of
moral responsibility.”). Inasmuch as imperfect competition in the market for methodologies is respon-
sible for creating a professional elite, which then enables judicial decisionmaking to fill a subterfugal
role in values debates, there may be efficiency advantages over a perfectly competitive market.
292. Dahlia Lithwick, Scaliapalooza: The Supreme Court’s Pocket Jeremiah, SLATE, Oct. 30, 2003,
http://www.slate.com/id/2090532.
293. Stephen A. Newman, Political Advocacy on the Supreme Court: The Damaging Rhetoric of
Antonin Scalia, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 907, 919–20 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
294. Scalia, supra note 4, at 3.
295. See, e.g., id. at 3–9 (sardonically describing legal education and putting words like “distinguish-
ing” and “hypotheticals” in quotes).
296. See Dahlia Lithwick, Talk of the Gown: What the Supreme Court Justices Won’t Say Speaks
Volumes, SLATE, Jan. 27, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2158322 (contrasting “the taut lines of [Sca-
lia’s] theory of ‘originalism’” with Justice Breyer’s “active liberty,” which “requires a whole hour with
Charlie Rose to unpack”).
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to judges in their alternate capacities as consumers of methodology. It is
important in a democratic society that members of the public who are so
inclined understand the process by which government officials make momen-
tous decisions. Judges are also citizens, and the conscientious among them wish
to understand and to be able to articulate what it means for them to interpret the
Constitution in good faith. As most have neither the time nor the temperament
to theorize, the appeal of bright-line rules of decision should not be underesti-
mated.
2. Populism
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the plurality described the Court as being
“invested with the authority to decide [the American people’s] constitutional
cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals.”297 Multiple
generations of legal scholars have sought to demonstrate, mostly to each other,
that non-originalist methodologies do not necessarily occasion judges deciding
our values on our behalf and indeed do not necessarily endow judges with any
more discretion than originalism. Statements of the sort made in Casey show
that there is work still to be done. Originalists have appropriated the rhetoric of
judicial restraint that was once the province of progressive judges.298 Justice
Scalia’s response to the Casey passage makes the point:
The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare this Nietzschean
vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges—leading a Volk who will be
“tested by following,” and whose very “belief in themselves” is mystically
bound up in their “understanding” of a Court that “speak[s] before all others
for their constitutional ideals”—with the somewhat more modest role envi-
sioned for these lawyers by the Founders.299
Originalism is not inherently a doctrine of judicial restraint. Originalists
emphasize restraint in cases such as Casey but not in cases such as District of
Columbia v. Heller, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,300 and Kelo v. City of New London,301 creating the impression
that it is they who leave constitutional decisionmaking in the hands of the
people.
Lain atop the rhetoric of popular decisionmaking is the rhetoric of class
warfare.302 Justice Scalia’s frequent references to himself and his colleagues as
297. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
298. See supra section II.A.
299. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
300. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
301. Kelo v. City of New London, 549 U.S. 469 (2005).
302. See Charles Lane, Once Again, Scalia’s the Talk of the Town: Justice Renders Frank Out-of-
Court Opinions on 2000 Presidential Election, ‘Sicilian’ Gesture, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2006, at A2
(“[Scalia’s] is the voice of a conservative populist: combative, humorous, and sharply critical of the
media and of the legal establishment atop which he sits.”).
2009] 711SELLING ORIGINALISM
“nine lawyers” reinforces the impression that the Court, cloistered and aloof, is
out of touch with, even disdainful of, popular values.303 Justice Scalia tells
audiences that “[a] world in which these moral sentiments would be given full
expression by unelected judges”—which he describes as the alternative to
originalism—“would scare the devil out of me.”304 On this projected concep-
tion, the very notion of judicial review is an evil to be minimized if not
avoided,305 lest power-hungry elites usurp our sovereignty.306 Justice Scalia’s
rhetorical move is ancient and effective. Dismissive references to the Court as a
bunch of lawyers go back at least to the beginnings of the Lochner era.307 A
jurisprudence of originalism, says Justice Thomas,
places the authority for creating legal rules in the hands of the people and
their representatives rather than in the hands of the nonelected, unaccountable
federal judiciary. Thus, the Constitution means not what the Court says it
means, but what the delegates of the Philadelphia and of the state ratifying
conventions understood it to mean.308
303. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“By what
conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the nation?”);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is no cause for anyone
who believes in Casey to feel betrayed by this outcome. It has been arrived at by precisely the process
Casey promised—a democratic vote by nine lawyers . . . .”); Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, A
Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 526 (2005) (saying, to a
group of law students, “Do you think you’re representative of American society? Do you not realize
you are a small layer of cream at the top of the educational system, and that your views on innumerable
things are not the views of America at large?”); Alex Rawson, Scaling Down Scalia, DAILY PRINCETO-
NIAN, Feb. 27, 2001 (“To his mind, as he explained in answer to a question on abortion, there is no way
that five out of nine lawyers in Washington—in other words, a Supreme Court majority—have the right
to decide whether abortion is right or wrong.”); Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurispru-
dence of Justice Antonin Scalia, NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40, 42 (quoting a Scalia speech: “If the
Constitution is an empty bottle into which we pour whatever values—the evolving standards of
decency of a maturing society—why in the world would you let it be filled by judges? . . . Why you
would want to leave these enormously important social questions to nine lawyers with no constraints, I
cannot fathom.”); Antonin Scalia, ACLU Membership Conference Debate (Oct. 15, 2006) (“Why in the
world would you want nine people from a very uncharacteristic class of society—to wit, nine
lawyers—to decide how the Constitution evolves? It means whatever they think it ought to mean.”).
304. Lane, supra note 302.
305. The title of Justice Scalia’s influential essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, is exemplary. See
supra note 2.
306. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s statement that it is ‘tempting’ to acknowledge the authoritativeness of
tradition in order to ‘cur[b] the discretion of federal judges’ is of course rhetoric rather than reality; no
government official is ‘tempted’ to place restraints upon his own freedom of action, which is why Lord
Acton did not say ‘Power tends to purify.’ The Court’s temptation is in the quite opposite and more
natural direction—towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it succumbs.”
(internal citation omitted)).
307. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 97 (2007) (noting
the Farmers’ Alliance of Minnesota’s reference to the Court as “‘a squad of lawyers sitting as a supreme
authority high above Congress, the President, and people,’” following its property-rights-protecting
decision in Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway Company v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890)).
308. Thomas, supra note 286, at 7.
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The suggestion is that we the people have more in common with those long
deceased revolutionaries than with our elite contemporaries on the federal
bench.
3. Nativism
Originalists are almost uniformly opposed to citation of foreign and interna-
tional law in constitutional cases. That opposition arguably follows from the
theory of originalism but, as valuably perhaps, it also promotes the political
practice of originalism. It is safe to assume that among the few members of the
public who care deeply about the issue of foreign law citation, most are against
it. It has become routine for Congress members to seek to limit federal court
citation of foreign law309 and for conservative activists to call for the impeach-
ment of Justices who cite foreign materials in the course of constitutional
interpretation.310 Values imputed to “the Framers” or “the Founders” are not
only distinctly American but have acquired a presumption of rightness within
our political culture.311 An interpretive modality that avails itself of their views
and associates its own rightness with theirs gains an immediate rhetorical
advantage. Thus, at the joint investiture of originalists Rehnquist as Chief
Justice and Scalia as an Associate Justice, President Reagan ended his speech
with an ominous allusion:
The warning, more than a century ago, attributed to Daniel Webster, remains
as timeless as the document he revered. “Miracles do not cluster,” he said,
“Hold on to the Constitution of the United States of America and to the
Republic for which it stands—what has happened once in 6,000 years may
never happen again. Hold on to your Constitution, for if the American
Constitution shall fall there will be anarchy throughout the world.”312
Recall that during the Progressive era, constitutional preservationist groups
linked non-originalist methodologies to socialism and anarchy.313 So too with
Reagan. Associating Scalia and Rehnquist with proto-American and anti-
Communist values shines a spotlight on one of originalism’s more underappreci-
309. See, e.g., Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1070, 109th
Cong. (2005); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2082, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 3799, 108th
Cong. (2004).
310. See Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 546 n.11.
311. This has not always been so. During the progressive era, for example, Charles Beard helped
inspire widespread skepticism about the achievements and motivations of the Founders. See Ackerman,
supra note 244, at 1793–96 (discussing CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913)).
312. President Ronald Reagan, Address at the Investiture of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia at the White House (Sept. 26, 1986), in GREAT DEBATE, supra note
138, at 56.
313. See supra section II.A.
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ated selling features: its emphatic, irreducible “American-ness.”314
E. SELLING ORIGINALISM?
Some will greet my claims about the appeal of originalism with skepticism.
They will say that “originalist” is a rather obvious stand-in for “conservative”
and that the originalism debate is simply about results. On this view, the
populism to which a methodology appeals is the capacity to generate politically
popular outcomes. I do not believe that to be universally true. There are
certainly some who care only about outcomes, and a certain brand of originalist
is certainly, self-consciously, selling outcomes. But it is equally obvious, I
think, that some people, including some originalist judges, care about proce-
dural integrity as much as or more than outcomes, or at least that some people
believe that about themselves. Writes Thomas Keck,
[W]hile the Court’s rules, norms, and traditions allow (or even require) the
justices to act on and respond to political ideas and interests, broadly under-
stood, they generally discourage them from simply manipulating constitu-
tional arguments to achieve their preferred results or to advance the policies
of the president who appointed them.315
The thickening and thinning of judge-made constitutional law with which we
are ultimately concerned requires both consistency with a dominant political
agenda and an accompanying narrative that promises consistency with prevail-
ing legal norms.316 Much attention has been paid to the former in political
314. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 133, at 18 (“President Reagan was right to exhort us to ‘hold
on’ to the Framers’ Constitution because it is a remarkable document for a remarkable country.
President Reagan’s exceptionalist rhetoric explains why in most cases the Supreme Court should not
look for guidance to foreign constitutional law.”). Notably, originalism is quite unpopular in Europe and
Canada. See Peter W. Hogg, Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court, in INTERPRETING CONSTITU-
TIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 55, 83 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006); Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional
Adjudication in Europe and the United States, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 633, 656 (2004).
315. KECK, supra note 253, at 9.
316. See David A. Strauss, What Is Constitutional Theory?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 581, 589–90 (1999)
(“The fact that many people (even a majority) might disagree with a particular Supreme Court decision
. . . does not necessarily mean that that decision is wrong. . . . The decision may still be correct if it
follows from broader principles about constitutional interpretation that themselves are widely ac-
cepted . . . .”). There is conflicting evidence in the political science literature on the extent to which
individual ideological preferences influence public support for the Court as an institution, compare
Joseph Tanenhaus & Walter F. Murphy, Patterns of Public Support for the Supreme Court: A Panel
Study, 43 J. POL. 24 (1981) (finding that changes in diffuse support for the Court from 1966 to 1975
correlated with various ideological variables), with Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The
Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 658 (1992) (“[T]he mass
public does not seem to condition its basic loyalty toward the Court as an institution upon the
satisfaction of demands for particular policies or ideological positions.”), as well as over the extent to
which one’s satisfaction with individual Court decisions influences one’s support for the Court more
generally, see, e.g., Anke Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court
Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme
Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 633, 633–34 (1998) (noting the conflict in the literature). There is general
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science literature and, increasingly, among constitutional theorists.317 This Ar-
ticle emphasizes the significance of the latter, particularly in light of what I have
suggested is a popularization of methodological discourse.
Many originalists hope that succeeding in their particular project of transform-
ing legal norms will make the legal environment more hospitable to the
movement’s substantive political claims. It will not do, however, to mediate
those claims directly through the judiciary. Not only do many Americans
disagree with those political ends, but we also conceive of our federal judges
ideally as faithful to an apolitical agenda. What is needed, then, is an appeal that
is both pre-political and post-methodological. It must simultaneously appear to
be conventionally “legal” but must not in fact be indifferent to the outcomes
generated. Cases like Crawford v. Washington and Apprendi v. New Jersey are
originalist victories not because their results may be understood in politically
conservative terms318 but because they bolster a constitutional interpretive norm
that subordinates administrative convenience and contemporary understanding
to historical practice and original understanding. In short, they make originalism
look more legal.
* * *
Appeals to simplicity, populism, and nativism fall outside the nucleus of
conventional constitutional argument. But to the extent that the simple model I
have sketched accurately describes the originalist appeal, and insofar as original-
ism is in fact successful at translating ordinary politics into constitutional law,
these sociopolitical arguments have legitimating force. To the extent these
agreement that diffuse support for the Court—in short, support for the Court as an institution—remains
relatively stable (and generally positive) over long periods of time. See Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon
Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1116
(1997).
317. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 307, at 9 (“The judiciary may assert its own supremacy over
constitutional interpretation, but such claims ultimately must be supported by other political actors
making independent decisions about how the constitutional system should operate.”); Robert A. Dahl,
Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279,
285 (1957) (“[T]he policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy
views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”); Howard Gillman, How
Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States,
1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512 (2002) (arguing that the expansion of judicial power in the
late nineteenth century “is best understood as . . . familiar partisan or programmatic entrenchment”);
Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 35, 40–44 (1993) (discussing the incentives of legislatures to place decisionmaking in the
hands of the judiciary); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–83 (2001) (articulating a theory of “partisan entrenchment” to
explain what they view as the Rehnquist Court “revolution”); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial
Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) (emphasizing the need to integrate normative and positive
scholarship to understand the practice of judicial review); cf. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1323 (2006) (arguing that the Equal Rights Amendment movement altered the Court’s sex discrimina-
tion doctrine even though the amendment itself failed). See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 239;
ACKERMAN, supra note 58.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 192 & 193.
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popular appeals influence constitutional values, originalism’s success consti-
tutes a non-originalist argument for its legitimacy.
IV. ORIGINALISM’S LESSONS
I have argued that for all its proponents’ failure to win jurisprudential
arguments set in traditional theoretical terms, originalism’s staying power must
nevertheless be taken seriously by constitutional theorists. Post and Siegel are
quite right that originalism’s “capacity to influence the actual substance of
modern constitutional law illustrates how constitutional law is made in continu-
ous dialogue with political culture. Its success illustrates that the authority of
constitutional law does not derive merely from professional reason, but also
from reason incarnate in the body politic.”319 As it is marketed by its propo-
nents, originalism satisfies certain demands—for ease of explication, for the
appearance of value-neutrality, for diverting power from social and political
elites, and for divesting our constitutional politics of foreign influence—that are
evident in the market for constitutional ideas and that have arguably become
more relevant due to a relative democratization of that market. That these are
dynamic and conventional norms does not deprive them of their capacity to
legitimate a constitutional methodology and to calcify political preferences into
constitutional law.
It will be important to know how much these observations may be extrapo-
lated beyond originalism itself. Rarely, after all, have constitutional interpretive
methodologies been so discrete, practiced so overtly by judges, and marketed so
deliberately by political actors. Most judges are not constitutional theorists, and
most disclaim reliance on any one mode of reasoning in the face of ambiguity. I
would contend, however, that originalism itself is partly responsible for two
recent qualifications to that general trend. Chief Justice Roberts has announced
himself, at his confirmation hearing,320 in speeches,321 and in interviews,322 to
be committed to a jurisprudence of restraint and consensus. As Cass Sunstein
suggests, the Chief Justice has chosen to align himself with the Burkean
minimalist legal tradition, which emphasizes that “constitutional principles
must be built incrementally and by analogy, with close reference to long-
standing practices.”323 Minimalism is less a constitutional methodology than a
frame of reference and a set of presumptions. As a theoretical matter it gives
only limited instruction to judges who seek answers to difficult interpretive
questions. With sufficient emphasis, however, the Chief Justice’s minimalism
might have the capacity to perform a public role similar to a more specified
319. Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 570–71.
320. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 213, at 177.
321. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Commencement Address at the
Georgetown University Law Center (May 21, 2006) (“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of
a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide more.”).
322. See Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 104.
323. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006).
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constitutional methodology. Fulfilling that role depends not on minimalism’s
competence as a theory of interpretation, nor even perhaps on its actual practice
by Chief Justice Roberts, but rather on its persuasiveness as a justification for
constitutional decisions.
There is reason to believe that once the legal academy is through with it,
Robertsian minimalism will suffer a similar fate to Scalian originalism. Academ-
ics have already begun to notice the tension between his stated judicial philoso-
phy and his early results on the Court. In particular, the list of precedents
overturned in fact or in effect by the Roberts Court, and with the Chief in the
majority, is impressive.324 Originalism’s lesson, however, is that that tension
will not by itself be the measure of the effectiveness of Roberts’s minimalism.
Judicial minimalism is an attractive constitutional commodity for many of the
same reasons originalism is. It is easy to explain to lay audiences and it
explicitly wrests political control from unelected judges by instructing them to
make decisions only when absolutely necessary. Minimalism holds the promise,
moreover, of preserving the status quo, which most people (almost by defini-
tion) prefer most of the time. There are also indications that the telegenic Chief
Justice understands the need to shill. Within a little more than a year on the
Court, he discussed his judicial philosophy in an hour-long Nightline interview
at the University of Miami basketball arena,325 gave a lengthy interview to
Jeffrey Rosen for the Atlantic Monthly,326 and was prominently featured in a
PBS special on the Court.327 As Dahlia Lithwick has written, “[n]ot only is the
new chief justice unafraid of the media spotlight, he—perhaps alone among his
Supreme Court colleagues—has figured out how to use it to his advantage.”328
Justice Breyer also appears keen to the need to convince the public of the
324. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, No. 07-751 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009) (overruling in part Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (effectively
overruling United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (effectively overruling Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Bd. of Educ.,
389 U.S. 572 (1968) (per curiam)); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705
(2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)); FEC v. Wis.
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (effectively overruling McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003)); Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007) (overruling Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat
Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962) (per curiam), and Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per
curiam)); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (overruling in part Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957)); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (tacitly overruling Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000)). With the exceptions of Pearson, which was unanimous, and Twombly, which was 7-2,
each of those decisions was 5-4. Had the Chief Justice’s plurality opinion in Parents Involved been the
opinion of the Court, it would have substantially weakened and, I think, effectively overruled Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), decided just four years earlier.
325. Nightline (ABC television broadcast Nov. 13, 2006).
326. Rosen, supra note 322.
327. The Supreme Court (PBS television broadcast Jan. 31 & Feb. 6, 2007).
328. Dahlia Lithwick, The High Court Goes Courting: Supreme Court Justices Talk to the Media in
Self-Defense, SLATE, Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2153759. As is evident, I believe Justice
Scalia has also figured out how to use the media to his advantage. It will be useful to think about the
relationship between media-friendliness and constitutional theory as we debate the wisdom of televis-
ing Supreme Court oral arguments.
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rightness of his constitutional methodology. He is not camera-shy, having given
numerous lectures and having participated in a well-received series of debates
with Justice Scalia on the use of foreign and international materials in constitu-
tional interpretation.329 His recent book, Active Liberty, was short, plain-
spoken, and readable.330 Its obvious aim was to provide a relatively progressive
alternative to originalism. Its tack was to wrest the imprimatur of “democracy”
from Justice Scalia by focusing on the ways in which judicial review can and
should grant space for present Americans to reach consensus on difficult legal
questions.331 Whether Justice Breyer succeeds remains to be seen, though it
appears to me that his theory is neither concrete enough nor concise enough to
capture the public’s attention in any significant way.
My intuitions about Justice Breyer’s active liberty raise the question of
whether viewing constitutional theory in populist market terms can ever work to
the advantage of liberals, who generally want the Constitution to protect the
unpopular. Answering that question is not this Article’s aim and exceeds its
scope, but it is worth noting that the project is underway. As I have mentioned,
Post and Siegel have identified this problem in their work, and Jack Balkin,
Douglas Kendall, and James Ryan have recently advocated liberals’ appropriat-
ing originalist rhetoric and arguments to their own ends.332 These efforts face
difficulties but I do not think them futile. Originalists have done what all
constitutional theorists must do to be successful: They have married their
constitutional theory to a particular American (and particularly American)
self-conception. That self-conception is stable over short periods of time but is
nonetheless conventional and contingent; judges and their sympathetic market
intermediaries have the power to influence it. The arguments that the Constitu-
tion protects natural rights, or that a post-September 11 environment demands a
pluralistic and egalitarian political identity, or that evolving interpretation re-
flects the nature of truth in a post-Wiki world, are available for elaboration and
amplification by proponents of a non-originalist constitutional ideal. But avail-
ing oneself of such arguments is a political act, and in order to do so, liberals
will have to overcome any platonic objection to the politicization of constitu-
tional argument.
329. See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 303.
330. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
331. See id. at 109–11.
332. See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, Liberal Reading, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 2007, at 14,
16; Post & Siegel, supra note 14; Balkin, supra note 18; Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/07/originalism-is-for-progressives.html (July 25, 2007, 14:31 EDT);
see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, How Liberals Need To Approach Constitutional Theory, TNR
ONLINE, Sept. 18, 2007, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/news/5658.htm (arguing that Kendall and
Ryan mistakenly locate originalism’s appeal in its methodological rhetoric rather than in the substantive
ideals it implicitly promises).
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CONCLUSION
To say that constitutional argument must attend to politics is not to say, with
the Critical Legal Studies movement, that all law is politics or that the language
of law is false or self-contradictory. We live in a pluralistic society in which
multiple consumers at vastly different levels of political engagement are making
simultaneous decisions about how to evaluate government acts. On the views of
many non-originalist constitutional theorists, those consumers’ reactions, over
time, to constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court determine the pace and
direction of constitutional change and ultimately affect the legitimacy of subse-
quent Court decisions. Those reactions are themselves determined not solely by
the results in particular cases but by public reason-giving; that reason-giving
must, for some, fall within the contours of conventional constitutional argu-
ment.
Conventional constitutional argument may itself change, however. That change
may occur as new theories emerge, but it may also occur as the market for
constitutional methodologies evolves. Changes in the number and nature of
intermediaries in that market may broaden the audience for constitutional
argument and thereby alter the kinds of arguments that prove persuasive.
Arguments traditionally regarded as banal or political may on this model
displace or augment the conventional constitutional forms. A sensible theoreti-
cal grounding may thereby have a less certain relationship than it once did to
the legitimacy of a constitutional methodology.
Constitutional arguments with a certain aesthetic appeal are a rising stock.
We may deride those who buy such arguments for their irrational exuberance,
but in the realm of constitutional methodology that exuberance has the capacity
to create real value over time. It is accordingly imperative that constitutional
theory accommodate the relationship between social currency, political practice,
and higher law as applied to methodology. I have made some preliminary
observations about the appeal of originalism that seek to explain how a theory
of constitutional interpretation that locates legitimacy exclusively within the
original understanding may itself become legitimate precisely because of its
contributions to constitutional evolution. Those contributions are neither com-
plete nor irreversible. It remains legitimate for a judge to reject originalism in a
given case and will remain so for the foreseeable future. What is at stake is not
the legitimacy of individual decisions but their staying power. It is not that we
must recognize that all law is politics, but rather that we must theorize cre-
atively from the premise that, over time, politics of a certain sort becomes law.
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APPENDIX A
Evening News Stories Featuring Supreme Court Justices on ABC, CBS,
and NBC by Placement Within Broadcast
1st Third 2nd Third 3rd Third Total
Fortas 29 21 9 59
Burger 8 8 3 19
Haynsworth 43 41 19 103
Carswell 43 42 18 103
Blackmun 4 13 16 33
Powell 6 17 3 26
Rehnquist 12 30 7 49
Stevens 7 9 3 19
O’Connor 23 8 2 33
Scalia 15 8 4 27
Rehnquist 30 14 6 50
Bork 72 35 5 112
Kennedy 16 16 1 33
Souter 19 15 3 37
Thomas 89 50 16 155
Ginsburg 12 9 4 25
Breyer 15 6 1 22
Roberts 25 20 7 52
Alito 42 10 4 56
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APPENDIX B
References to Originalis(t)(m) in Three Major Newspapers
References to Original Intent in Three Major Newspapers
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